Discussion:
Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
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Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 02:23:41 UTC
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The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.

This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes. They should beware that the rule has been changed.

TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the final miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded codes.

<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>

==Summary==

本方法并不是来源于个人,而是中文比特币社区中集体智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different interest groups.<br/>

这是一种在协议升级时,对全网挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保护和激励的方法,避免不参与挖矿的节点没有升级的动力而受到损失。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes and non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive mechanism, the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain splitting.<br/>

发信号的多数矿工在达到激活条件后第一个宽限期(一个难度周期)后设置新区块版本号,孤立未升级矿工的低版本号的块。通过最初的中本聪共识,在第一个宽限期结束后,所有矿工将升级至最新版本或使用最新版本。在第二个宽限期(一个难度周期)后,矿工将仅接受新版本的交易,未升级的客户端发送的旧版本交易将无法得到新节点的转播也无法进入新版本区块。这将在保护用户资产的同时,提醒不挖矿的钱包节点升级。并在升级代码中加入对协议进行改动的部分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投票实施该项改动,以达成协议改动的广泛部署。<br/>

After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of 2016 blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms of the Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all mining nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the second grace period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes will only accept transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes not upgrading will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new versionbits. This will protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing replay attack and will function as a notification for them to upgrade. Codes dealing with protocol upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After the non-mining node upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the protocol upgrade and this will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of the protocol upgrade.<br/>

在该项改动广泛部署至客户端之后,依然由其激活条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>

==Motivation==

鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of the wallet nodes.<br/>

使用该方法可以在保证钱包节点资产安全的情况下,且通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。一旦钱包节点升级协议,保证矿工节点不仅工作在算力最长链上,还工作在比特币生态环境中其他钱包节点所使用的最长链上。在中本聪共识下不会出现分叉,以实现渐进式的协议升级。<br/>

Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners' nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also on the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin sphere. Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as protocol upgrades can be phased in.<br/>

==Specification==

1. 挖矿节点将使用 versionbits 版本位来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时,所有区块需要使用制定的 nVersion 来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将使用 tx version 来定义当前的交易版本。当前的 tx version 是 1,将允许 tx version 为 2 的交易,并在第二个宽限期之后,使 tx version 为 1 的交易非法。<br/>

1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed. After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as invalid.<br/>


==Deployment==
协议升级,将分成三步逐步实施。并有一个可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>

Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>

1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点使用 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点在监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016 个区块均发送了相同的支持信号,进入下一阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第一个宽限期 2016 的区块后,且总信号区块超过了 2218/4032,就开始使用新的区块版本打包区块,并同时开始孤立旧版本。此时所有节点和钱包,将可以使用新版本号发送交易,同时兼容旧版本号交易。<br/>
3. 钱包节点升级。在挖矿节点监测到第二个宽限期 4032 个连续的新版本的区块后,开始拒绝旧版本号的交易,只打包/转播新版本号的交易。同时将从内存池中删除旧版本号的交易。<br/>
4. (可选的)协议升级。在第三阶段中包含有第四阶段的升级代码。当我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本交易后,必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。则此时可以通过矿工节点投票的方式完成全网络的协议升级。

1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>

2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>

3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged from memory pools.<br/>

4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and finish this upgrade.<br/>

至此,协议升级完成。<br/>

At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>

==Benefits==

1. 仅需要多数的矿工发信号后即可激活。在中本聪的比特币论文中,99.9% 的可能性下,55% 的矿工将在 340 个区块后确保成为最长链。这将最大可能减小通过控制少数算力而拖延网络升级的可能性。我们可以预见到在算力信号超过 51% 后,挖矿节点将迅速的在第一个宽限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 在两个宽限期内,钱包节点交易不受影响,有足够的时间升级钱包软件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含在 block header 中,并不影响 SPV 挖矿过程。(看起来是?)<br/>
4. 在两个宽限期后,钱包节点将必须升级钱包,否则因没有算力支持将无法发送交易,也无法确认。相对于在节点间重新达成新的共识,这种状况并没有更糟糕。<br/>
5. 钱包节点的账本将得到尊重和保护。使用链下钱包的用户将需要在钱包服务提供商的声明之后决定提至链上钱包或跟随。<br/>
6. 将来的协议升级,可以在升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激活投票。这将预留足够的时间让节点升级软件以支持新的协议。即使矿工投票激活失败也不影响现状。<br/>

1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after 340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the first grace period. <br/>
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service providers after they got the public notification from the service providers. <br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>


==Risks==

1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4. 存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>

1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished, genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>


==Implementation==
___TBD___
James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 05:44:23 UTC
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On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 9:23 PM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes. They should beware that the rule has been changed.
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the final miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded codes.
<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>
==Summary==
本方法并不是来源于个人,而是中文比特币社区中集体智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different interest groups.<br/>
这是一种在协议升级时,对全网挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保护和激励的方法,避免不参与挖矿的节点没有升级的动力而受到损失。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes and non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive mechanism, the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain splitting.<br/>
发信号的多数矿工在达到激活条件后第一个宽限期(一个难度周期)后设置新区块版本号,孤立未升级矿工的低版本号的块。通过最初的中本聪共识,在第一个宽限期结束后,所有矿工将升级至最新版本或使用最新版本。在第二个宽限期(一个难度周期)后,矿工将仅接受新版本的交易,未升级的客户端发送的旧版本交易将无法得到新节点的转播也无法进入新版本区块。这将在保护用户资产的同时,提醒不挖矿的钱包节点升级。并在升级代码中加入对协议进行改动的部分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投票实施该项改动,以达成协议改动的广泛部署。<br/>
After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of 2016 blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms of the Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all mining nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the second grace period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes will only accept transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes not upgrading will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new versionbits. This will protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing replay attack and will function as a notification for them to upgrade. Codes dealing with protocol upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After the non-mining node upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the protocol upgrade and this will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of the protocol upgrade.<br/>
在该项改动广泛部署至客户端之后,依然由其激活条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>
==Motivation==
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of the wallet nodes.<br/>
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
使用该方法可以在保证钱包节点资产安全的情况下,且通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。一旦钱包节点升级协议,保证矿工节点不仅工作在算力最长链上,还工作在比特币生态环境中其他钱包节点所使用的最长链上。在中本聪共识下不会出现分叉,以实现渐进式的协议升级。<br/>
Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners' nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also on the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin sphere. Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as protocol upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
There is no way to guarantee a wallet node will accept a particular
block since that is always up to the user.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将使用 versionbits 版本位来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时,所有区块需要使用制定的 nVersion 来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将使用 tx version 来定义当前的交易版本。当前的 tx version 是 1,将允许 tx version 为 2 的交易,并在第二个宽限期之后,使 tx version 为 1 的交易非法。<br/>
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed. After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as invalid.<br/>
Sounds like this would cause issues with pre-signed time locked transactions.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Deployment==
协议升级,将分成三步逐步实施。并有一个可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点使用 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点在监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016 个区块均发送了相同的支持信号,进入下一阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第一个宽限期 2016 的区块后,且总信号区块超过了 2218/4032,就开始使用新的区块版本打包区块,并同时开始孤立旧版本。此时所有节点和钱包,将可以使用新版本号发送交易,同时兼容旧版本号交易。<br/>
3. 钱包节点升级。在挖矿节点监测到第二个宽限期 4032 个连续的新版本的区块后,开始拒绝旧版本号的交易,只打包/转播新版本号的交易。同时将从内存池中删除旧版本号的交易。<br/>
4. (可选的)协议升级。在第三阶段中包含有第四阶段的升级代码。当我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本交易后,必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。则此时可以通过矿工节点投票的方式完成全网络的协议升级。
1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>
3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged from memory pools.<br/>
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and finish this upgrade.<br/>
至此,协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需要多数的矿工发信号后即可激活。在中本聪的比特币论文中,99.9% 的可能性下,55% 的矿工将在 340 个区块后确保成为最长链。这将最大可能减小通过控制少数算力而拖延网络升级的可能性。我们可以预见到在算力信号超过 51% 后,挖矿节点将迅速的在第一个宽限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 在两个宽限期内,钱包节点交易不受影响,有足够的时间升级钱包软件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含在 block header 中,并不影响 SPV 挖矿过程。(看起来是?)<br/>
4. 在两个宽限期后,钱包节点将必须升级钱包,否则因没有算力支持将无法发送交易,也无法确认。相对于在节点间重新达成新的共识,这种状况并没有更糟糕。<br/>
5. 钱包节点的账本将得到尊重和保护。使用链下钱包的用户将需要在钱包服务提供商的声明之后决定提至链上钱包或跟随。<br/>
6. 将来的协议升级,可以在升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激活投票。这将预留足够的时间让节点升级软件以支持新的协议。即使矿工投票激活失败也不影响现状。<br/>
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after 340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the first grace period. <br/>
Technically soft forks can be implemented at 55% hashpower already
without an orphaning period(like BIP16). Those that don't upgrade
would just be at risk of mining invalid blocks. One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision since they can simply choose
to reject the fork and false signal.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
The widely deployed stratum based SPV mining does not really provide a
proper way to validate nversion of the previous block, it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
Previous consensus changes have largely been done in backwards
compatible ways which lets users opt-in to new features. In general
backwards compatibility is considered a good thing, this seems to make
that worse.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service providers after they got the public notification from the service providers. <br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4. 存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
Miners can simply announce they are false signalling with coinbase
tags and other methods. This activation method would likely not be
viable for controversial changes.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished, genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
Users would likely take into account markets and other factors when
deciding what to do, the total number of nodes doesn't really matter
much. Miner signalling is not necessarily indicative of economic and
user support.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 07:19:24 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Thank you very much for detailed feedback. Sorry for my understanding of
English being poor. I’ll try to answer that.
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 9:23 PM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or
need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes. They
should beware that the rule has been changed.
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all miners
upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must upgrade
(with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the final miner
vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded codes.
==Motivation==
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the
non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading
the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When there is
disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no mechanism
to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely accepted by the
wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of the wallet
nodes.<br/>
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
是的我认为这些节点非常重要,因此不愿意看到这些节点因为无法预见到网络上可能发生的改变而蒙受损失。这些节点依然拥有选择的权利,比如通过类似于 BIP148
的方法。
I admitted that these nodes a very important. so we don’t want these nodes
suffer financial loss by undetectable network change. These nodes always
have choice like BIP148.
使用该方法可以在保证钱包节点资产安全的情况下,且通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。一旦钱包节点升级协议,保证矿工节点不仅工作在算力最长链上,还工作在比特币生态环境中其他钱包节点所使用的最长链上。在中本聪共识下不会出现分叉,以实现渐进式的协议升级。<br/>
Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can be
used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the wallet
nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners' nodes can
be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also on the
longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin sphere.
Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as protocol
upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
There is no way to guarantee a wallet node will accept a particular
block since that is always up to the user.
我们无法对此进行保证。但是我们能够提供一种让这些节点了解并参与部署改变的激励。
We can not have any guarantee. but we can have incentives that they
participate and be aware about the change happening.
用户总是可以进行选择。
Users always have choice.
==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将使用 versionbits 版本位来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时,所有区块需要使用制定的 nVersion 来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将使用 tx version 来定义当前的交易版本。当前的 tx version 是 1,将允许 tx version 为 2
的交易,并在第二个宽限期之后,使 tx version 为 1 的交易非法。<br/>
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is active,
all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version transactions.
Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed. After the second
grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as invalid.<br/>
Sounds like this would cause issues with pre-signed time locked transactions.
我们可以在第四阶段中重新允许这些交易。无论升级是否成功激活,他们都需要为此做好准备。他们并不能被丢下甚至被欺骗为什么都没有发生。
They can be re-enable in the successful or unsuccessful activation of the
fourth stage. Whether or not, what they need is to be prepared for the
future coming. But they can’t be left behind or be cheated like nothing
happened.
==Deployment==
协议升级,将分成三步逐步实施。并有一个可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an optional
fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点使用 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点在监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016
个区块均发送了相同的支持信号,进入下一阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第一个宽限期 2016 的区块后,且总信号区块超过了
2218/4032,就开始使用新的区块版本打包区块,并同时开始孤立旧版本。此时所有节点和钱包,将可以使用新版本号发送交易,同时兼容旧版本号交易。<br/>
3. 钱包节点升级。在挖矿节点监测到第二个宽限期 4032
个连续的新版本的区块后,开始拒绝旧版本号的交易,只打包/转播新版本号的交易。同时将从内存池中删除旧版本号的交易。<br/>
4.
(可选的)协议升级。在第三阶段中包含有第四阶段的升级代码。当我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本交易后,必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。则此时可以通过矿工节点投票的方式完成全网络的协议升级。
1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be
activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks and
total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting
blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old
versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new
versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>
3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new
versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old
versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and
included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged
from memory pools.<br/>
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol upgrade
can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes upgrades to
support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol upgrade must
be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and finish this
upgrade.<br/>
至此,协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需要多数的矿工发信号后即可激活。在中本聪的比特币论文中,99.9% 的可能性下,55% 的矿工将在 340
个区块后确保成为最长链。这将最大可能减小通过控制少数算力而拖延网络升级的可能性。我们可以预见到在算力信号超过 51%
后,挖矿节点将迅速的在第一个宽限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 在两个宽限期内,钱包节点交易不受影响,有足够的时间升级钱包软件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含在 block header 中,并不影响 SPV 挖矿过程。(看起来是?)<br/>
4.
在两个宽限期后,钱包节点将必须升级钱包,否则因没有算力支持将无法发送交易,也无法确认。相对于在节点间重新达成新的共识,这种状况并没有更糟糕。<br/>
5. 钱包节点的账本将得到尊重和保护。使用链下钱包的用户将需要在钱包服务提供商的声明之后决定提至链上钱包或跟随。<br/>
6.
将来的协议升级,可以在升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激活投票。这将预留足够的时间让节点升级软件以支持新的协议。即使矿工投票激活失败也不影响现状。<br/>
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in the
paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after 340
blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of delaying
network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We can
foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the first
grace period. <br/>
Technically soft forks can be implemented at 55% hashpower already
without an orphaning period(like BIP16). Those that don't upgrade
would just be at risk of mining invalid blocks. One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision since they can simply choose
to reject the fork and false signal.
假信号的问题在我看来无法解决。但如果多数不同意这个改变,为什么他们还要欺骗?如果多数如中本聪共识中描述的那样是诚实可信的,那就不会有任何问题。通过算力总能分出胜负。
False signal can’t be solved in my opinion. If the majority part just don’t
agree with the change, why they cheat? If the majority part is honest as
described in nakamoto consensus, I think that won’t be a problem. CPU power
always decides.
Nakamoto consensus is used to determine the longest chain among
multiple valid chains, it's not enough to determine validity by
itself. For example in a hard fork if a minority of hashpower decided
not to fork then they would simply consider the forked chain invalid
and ignore it, even if that majority chain had significantly more
work.
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be
affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
The widely deployed stratum based SPV mining does not really provide a
proper way to validate nversion of the previous block, it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
也许我是错的我并不肯定。请对如何让这个方法兼容 SPY 挖矿提出建设性意见。
Maybe I’m wrong. Please give some advice that how to make it compatible with
SPY mining.
It's just problematic in general and I'm not sure there's a good way
around it other than putting as many safety nets as possible in place
to limit the amount of time miners mine on invalid work. For example
when an invalid BU blocks was mined on the network more than 50% of
hashpower mined on top of it for a short period of time.
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they
cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new
consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
Previous consensus changes have largely been done in backwards
compatible ways which lets users opt-in to new features. In general
backwards compatibility is considered a good thing, this seems to make
that worse.
这并没有强制我们的节点作出任何改变共识的表示。仅仅让这些节点为接下来可能的改变做好准备。
It would not force our nodes to do anything that changes the consensus. But
they should be prepared for the **maybe** upcoming changes.
协议的改变将通过矿工投票产生,但是这个过程应该被所有节点所知晓并承认。
Protocol upgrades could be done using miners vote. but the progress of
voting should be acknowledged by all nodes.
I'm not seeing how it could be considered backwards compatible if
"they cannot send transactions or get any confirmations".
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users of
off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service
providers after they got the public notification from the service providers.
<br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of nodes,
and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There would be
enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new protocols. Even
in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will not worsen and
the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4.
存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the
longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary
fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the
perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false
signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the
signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the
miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
Miners can simply announce they are false signalling with coinbase
tags and other methods. This activation method would likely not be
viable for controversial changes.
如果大多数矿工是诚实的,假信号不会有问题。
False signal won’t be a problem if majority miners are honest.
I'm referring to a potential situation where 55% of miners want a
change and 45% don't, the 45% could false signal.
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new
protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished,
genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
Users would likely take into account markets and other factors when
deciding what to do, the total number of nodes doesn't really matter
much. Miner signalling is not necessarily indicative of economic and
user support.
矿工需要在可以确保大多数用户不被升级影响的情况下才能公正投票。
Miners should vote unbiasedly under the condition that most users are not
affected by protocol upgrading.
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol
consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most
passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 08:37:43 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Thank you very much for detailed feedback. Sorry for my understanding of
English being poor. I’ll try to answer that.
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in the
paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after 340
blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of delaying
network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We can
foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the first
grace period. <br/>
Technically soft forks can be implemented at 55% hashpower already
without an orphaning period(like BIP16). Those that don't upgrade
would just be at risk of mining invalid blocks. One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision since they can simply choose
to reject the fork and false signal.
假信号的问题在我看来无法解决。但如果多数不同意这个改变,为什么他们还要欺骗?如果多数如中本聪共识中描述的那样是诚实可信的,那就不会有任何问题。通过算力总能分出胜负。
False signal can’t be solved in my opinion. If the majority part just don’t
agree with the change, why they cheat? If the majority part is honest as
described in nakamoto consensus, I think that won’t be a problem. CPU power
always decides.
Nakamoto consensus is used to determine the longest chain among
multiple valid chains, it's not enough to determine validity by
itself. For example in a hard fork if a minority of hashpower decided
not to fork then they would simply consider the forked chain invalid
and ignore it, even if that majority chain had significantly more
work.
节点需要自主决定是否跟随协议升级。但是他们不能被动的什么都不做。他们总是存在有多种的选择。
The node should decide to follow the protocol upgrade or not. But they can’t
just be passive and do nothing. The choice is always provided.
如果他们并不相信大多数的矿工,他们可以选择一些没有矿工角色的替代币。
If they don’t trust the choice of majority miners, they can use some alt
coin that don’t including miners’ part.
They generally don't have to switch to an altcoin when they get to
choose which blocks they accept ultimately. This is a key component of
Bitcoin's incentive model since it makes it so miners are unlikely to
do a hard fork if their blocks would not be accepted by nodes/users.
For example if 55% of miners wanted to hard fork and change the block
reward back to 50 BTC the minority side would not need to switch to an
altcoin, they would just need to ignore those 50 BTC block reward
blocks.
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be
affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
The widely deployed stratum based SPV mining does not really provide a
proper way to validate nversion of the previous block, it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
也许我是错的我并不肯定。请对如何让这个方法兼容 SPY 挖矿提出建设性意见。
Maybe I’m wrong. Please give some advice that how to make it compatible with
SPY mining.
It's just problematic in general and I'm not sure there's a good way
around it other than putting as many safety nets as possible in place
to limit the amount of time miners mine on invalid work. For example
when an invalid BU blocks was mined on the network more than 50% of
hashpower mined on top of it for a short period of time.
我们应当引入区块校验,但如何为不验证进行 SPY 挖矿的矿工提供激励是另外一个问题了。
We should introduce block validation in the code, but how to provide
incentive to no-validating SPY miner is another problem.
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they
cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new
consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
Previous consensus changes have largely been done in backwards
compatible ways which lets users opt-in to new features. In general
backwards compatibility is considered a good thing, this seems to make
that worse.
这并没有强制我们的节点作出任何改变共识的表示。仅仅让这些节点为接下来可能的改变做好准备。
It would not force our nodes to do anything that changes the consensus. But
they should be prepared for the **maybe** upcoming changes.
协议的改变将通过矿工投票产生,但是这个过程应该被所有节点所知晓并承认。
Protocol upgrades could be done using miners vote. but the progress of
voting should be acknowledged by all nodes.
I'm not seeing how it could be considered backwards compatible if
"they cannot send transactions or get any confirmations”.
我并不把这个方法看作是完全的向后兼容。在大家都认可“区块高度xxx后,执行xxx”的时候,我并不认为这很重要。
I don’t see them as completely backwards compatible. since I don’t see that
is important if we all agree with “after block height xxx, then xxx”.
我们依然可以从创世区块开始一直验证到今天。
And we can validate from the genesis block till today.
By backwards compatible I mean being able to continue functioning
without updating the node, soft forks are generally backwards
compatible because you can still transact even if you don't upgrade
your node to support the soft fork, you just won't be able to use the
new soft fork features.
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users of
off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service
providers after they got the public notification from the service providers.
<br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of nodes,
and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There would be
enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new protocols. Even
in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will not worsen and
the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4.
存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the
longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary
fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the
perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false
signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the
signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the
miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
Miners can simply announce they are false signalling with coinbase
tags and other methods. This activation method would likely not be
viable for controversial changes.
如果大多数矿工是诚实的,假信号不会有问题。
False signal won’t be a problem if majority miners are honest.
I'm referring to a potential situation where 55% of miners want a
change and 45% don't, the 45% could false signal.
当然,45% 可以发送假信号,可以和部分节点共谋。但这是当前已经存在的问题,并没有因此更糟糕。
Of cause, there could be false signal from 45% and have conspiracy with some
nodes. But that’s the problem we have today, and it don’t get any worse (nor
any better).
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new
protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished,
genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
Users would likely take into account markets and other factors when
deciding what to do, the total number of nodes doesn't really matter
much. Miner signalling is not necessarily indicative of economic and
user support.
矿工需要在可以确保大多数用户不被升级影响的情况下才能公正投票。
Miners should vote unbiasedly under the condition that most users are not
affected by protocol upgrading.
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol
consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most
passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Jared Lee Richardson via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 19:35:13 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.

What you're describing is effectively the same as BU.

Nodes follow chains, they do not decide the victor. The average user
follows the default of the software, which is to follow the longest valid
chain. Forcing the average user to decide which software to run is far
more valuable than allowing "the software" to decide things, when in fact
all it will do is decide the previous default.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision
This is true and a good point. A false signal from miners could trick the
honest miners into forking off prematurely with a minority.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
This is the job of the stratum server and the pool operator. These are
distinct responsibilities; Miners should choose a pool operator in line
with their desires. Solo mining is basically dead, as it will never again
be practical(and has not been for at least 2 years) for the same hardware
that does the mining to also do full node operation.

If the pool operator/stratum server also does not do validation, then any
number of problems could occur.




On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:44 PM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev <
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 9:23 PM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing
or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes.
They should beware that the rule has been changed.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all
miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must
upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the
final miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same
upgraded codes.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>
==Summary==
本方法并䞍是来源于䞪人而是䞭文比特垁瀟区䞭集䜓智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of
collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different interest
groups.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
这是䞀种圚协议升级时对党眑挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保技和激励的方法避免䞍参䞎挖矿的节点没有升级的劚力而受到损倱。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes and
non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive mechanism,
the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain
splitting.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
发信号的倚数矿工圚蟟到激掻条件后第䞀䞪宜限期䞀䞪隟床呚期后讟眮新区块版本号孀立未升级矿工的䜎版本号的块。
通过最初的䞭本聪共识圚第䞀䞪宜限期结束后所有矿工将升级至最新版本或䜿甚最新版本。圚第二䞪宜限期䞀䞪隟床呚期后矿工将仅接受新版本的亀易
未升级的客户端发送的旧版本亀易将无法埗到新节点的蜬播也无法进入新版本区块。这将圚保技甚户资产的同时提醒䞍挖矿的钱包节点升级。
并圚升级代码䞭加入对协议进行改劚的郚分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投祚实斜该项改劚以蟟成协议改劚的广泛郚眲。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new
block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of 2016
blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms of
the Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all
mining nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the
second grace period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes
will only accept transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes
not upgrading will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new
versionbits. This will protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing
replay attack and will function as a notification for them to upgrade.
Codes dealing with protocol upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After
the non-mining node upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the
protocol upgrade and this will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of
the protocol upgrade.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
圚该项改劚广泛郚眲至客户端之后䟝然由其激掻条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently
even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Motivation==
鉎于最初的比特垁协议并未考虑䞍参䞎挖矿的钱包节点富臎这些钱包节点的协议升级是被劚的懒惰的。
圓圚升级方向䞊出现分歧时矿工也䞍愿意圚错误的铟䞊挖矿䜆矿工又没有任䜕方法可以确保正圚延长的铟是被钱包节点广泛接受
的铟。这将圱响钱包节点的安党。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider
the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that
upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When
there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no
mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely
accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of
the wallet nodes.<br/>
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
䜿甚该方法可以圚保证钱包节点资产安党的情况䞋䞔通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。䞀旊钱包节点升级协议保证矿工节点䞍仅工䜜圚算力最长铟䞊
还工䜜圚比特垁生态环境䞭其他钱包节点所䜿甚的最长铟䞊。圚䞭本聪共识䞋䞍䌚出现分叉以实现析进匏的协议升级。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can
be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the
wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners'
nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also
on the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin
sphere. Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as
protocol upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
There is no way to guarantee a wallet node will accept a particular
block since that is always up to the user.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将䜿甚 versionbits 版本䜍来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时所有区块需芁䜿甚制定的 nVersion 来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将䜿甚 tx version 来定义圓前的亀易版本。圓前的 tx version 是 1将允讞 tx version 䞺 2
的亀易并圚第二䞪宜限期之后䜿 tx version 䞺 1 的亀易非法。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is
active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version
transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed.
After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as
invalid.<br/>
Sounds like this would cause issues with pre-signed time locked transactions.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Deployment==
协议升级将分成䞉步逐步实斜。并有䞀䞪可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an
optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点䜿甚 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点圚监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016
䞪区块均发送了盞同的支持信号进入䞋䞀阶段。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第䞀䞪宜限期 2016 的区块后䞔总信号区块超过了 2218/4032就匀始䜿甚新的区块版本打包区块
并同时匀始孀立旧版本。歀时所有节点和钱包将可以䜿甚新版本号发送亀易同时兌容旧版本号亀易。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
3. 钱包节点升级。圚挖矿节点监测到第二䞪宜限期 4032 䞪连续的新版本的区块后匀始拒绝旧版本号的亀易只打包
蜬播新版本号的亀易。同时将从内存池䞭删陀旧版本号的亀易。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. 可选的协议升级。圚第䞉阶段䞭包含有第四阶段的升级代码。圓我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本亀易后必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。
则歀时可以通过矿工节点投祚的方匏完成党眑络的协议升级。
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be
activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks
and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting
blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old
versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new
versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new
versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old
versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and
included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged
from memory pools.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol
upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes
upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol
upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and
finish this upgrade.<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
至歀协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需芁倚数的矿工发信号后即可激掻。圚䞭本聪的比特垁论文䞭99.9% 的可胜性䞋55% 的矿工将圚 340 䞪区块后确保成䞺最长铟。
这将最倧可胜减小通过控制少数算力而拖延眑络升级的可胜性。我们可以预见到圚算力信号超过 51%
后挖矿节点将迅速的圚第䞀䞪宜限期内进行升级。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. 圚䞀䞪宜限期内钱包节点亀易䞍受圱响有足借的时闎升级钱包蜯件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含圚 block header 䞭并䞍圱响 SPV 挖矿过皋。看起来是<br/>
4. 圚䞀䞪宜限期后钱包节点将必须升级钱包吊则因没有算力支持将无法发送亀易也无法确讀。
盞对于圚节点闎重新蟟成新的共识这种状况并没有曎糟糕。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
5. 钱包节点的莊本将埗到尊重和保技。䜿甚铟䞋钱包的甚户将需芁圚钱包服务提䟛商的声明之后决定提至铟䞊钱包或跟随。<br/>
6. 将来的协议升级可以圚升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激掻投祚。这将预留足借的时闎让节点升级蜯件以支持新的协议。
即䜿矿工投祚激掻倱莥也䞍圱响现状。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in
the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain
after 340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility
of delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing
power. We can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade
within the first grace period. <br/>
Technically soft forks can be implemented at 55% hashpower already
without an orphaning period(like BIP16). Those that don't upgrade
would just be at risk of mining invalid blocks. One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision since they can simply choose
to reject the fork and false signal.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be
affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining.
<br/>
The widely deployed stratum based SPV mining does not really provide a
proper way to validate nversion of the previous block, it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they
cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming
new consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
Previous consensus changes have largely been done in backwards
compatible ways which lets users opt-in to new features. In general
backwards compatibility is considered a good thing, this seems to make
that worse.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users
of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the
service providers after they got the public notification from the service
providers. <br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of
nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There
would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new
protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will
not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Risks==
1. 算力的波劚䌚圱响最长铟的结果。因歀越高的激掻比䟋芁求将减少短时闎分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可胜发假信号来避免被孀立䜆圚钱包节点看来无法区分是吊是假信号只胜升级。而钱包节点升级之后矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可胜发假信号来仅升级版本号而䞍支持绑定的协议升级代码䜆钱包节点数量无法刀别
䞥肃的真实节点应圓跟随可证实的矿工投祚结果。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. 存圚少郚分矿工和钱包节点共谋圚新协议升级激掻后䟝然䜿甚老协议挖矿的可胜。这种可胜随时发生无法杜绝
䜆通过让沉默的倧倚数钱包节点升级的方匏可以降䜎这种行䞺垊来的利益。<br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the
longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of
temporary fork. <br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the
perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false
signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the
signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the
miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
Miners can simply announce they are false signalling with coinbase
tags and other methods. This activation method would likely not be
viable for controversial changes.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new
protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished,
genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
Users would likely take into account markets and other factors when
deciding what to do, the total number of nodes doesn't really matter
much. Miner signalling is not necessarily indicative of economic and
user support.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol
consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most
passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 00:23:06 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:35 PM, Jared Lee Richardson
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
What you're describing is effectively the same as BU.
BU by default uses an "Accept Depth" parameter which effectively lets
miners decide block size rules and allows for resource requirements
that are too high for many users to validate. The block size settings
there are effectively placebo controls.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Nodes follow chains, they do not decide the victor. The average user
follows the default of the software, which is to follow the longest valid
chain. Forcing the average user to decide which software to run is far more
valuable than allowing "the software" to decide things, when in fact all it
will do is decide the previous default.
That's largely true that they typically don't decide the victor in
soft forks unless they are the ones to activate the rules
changes(satoshi did this a few times in the early days), however they
make it very difficult for a hard fork to be activated without
consent. Yes, I'm not advocating for having runtime consensus settings
for nodes either, I'm advocating that resource requirements be low
enough that full validation remains possible for a large percentage of
the economy.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision
This is true and a good point. A false signal from miners could trick the
honest miners into forking off prematurely with a minority.
More likely the false signal would be used during the orphaning period
to prevent blocks from being orphaned for miners that don't want to
follow the fork.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
This is the job of the stratum server and the pool operator. These are
distinct responsibilities; Miners should choose a pool operator in line with
their desires. Solo mining is basically dead, as it will never again be
practical(and has not been for at least 2 years) for the same hardware that
does the mining to also do full node operation.
If the pool operator/stratum server also does not do validation, then any
number of problems could occur.
Yes, there is a good amount of risk with validationless mining right
now here since it's well known that over half of mining pools use
validationless mining to some degree. This may not be too bad though
due to fallbacks but the risk is probably fairly implementation
specific.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:44 PM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 9:23 PM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing
or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes.
They should beware that the rule has been changed.
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all
miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must
upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the final
miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded
codes.
<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>
==Summary==
本方法并不是来源于个人,而是中文比特币社区中集体智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of
collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different interest
groups.<br/>
这是一种在协议升级时,对全网挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保护和激励的方法,避免不参与挖矿的节点没有升级的动力而受到损失。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes and
non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive mechanism,
the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain
splitting.<br/>
发信号的多数矿工在达到激活条件后第一个宽限期(一个难度周期)后设置新区块版本号,孤立未升级矿工的低版本号的块。通过最初的中本聪共识,在第一个宽限期结束后,所有矿工将升级至最新版本或使用最新版本。在第二个宽限期(一个难度周期)后,矿工将仅接受新版本的交易,未升级的客户端发送的旧版本交易将无法得到新节点的转播也无法进入新版本区块。这将在保护用户资产的同时,提醒不挖矿的钱包节点升级。并在升级代码中加入对协议进行改动的部分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投票实施该项改动,以达成协议改动的广泛部署。<br/>
After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new
block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of 2016
blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms of the
Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all mining
nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the second grace
period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes will only accept
transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes not upgrading
will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new versionbits. This will
protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing replay attack and will
function as a notification for them to upgrade. Codes dealing with protocol
upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After the non-mining node
upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the protocol upgrade and this
will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of the protocol upgrade.<br/>
在该项改动广泛部署至客户端之后,依然由其激活条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently
even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>
==Motivation==
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider
the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that
upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When
there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no
mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely
accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of
the wallet nodes.<br/>
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
使用该方法可以在保证钱包节点资产安全的情况下,且通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。一旦钱包节点升级协议,保证矿工节点不仅工作在算力最长链上,还工作在比特币生态环境中其他钱包节点所使用的最长链上。在中本聪共识下不会出现分叉,以实现渐进式的协议升级。<br/>
Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can
be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the
wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners'
nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also on
the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin sphere.
Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as protocol
upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
There is no way to guarantee a wallet node will accept a particular
block since that is always up to the user.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将使用 versionbits 版本位来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时,所有区块需要使用制定的 nVersion
来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将使用 tx version 来定义当前的交易版本。当前的 tx version 是 1,将允许 tx version 为 2
的交易,并在第二个宽限期之后,使 tx version 为 1 的交易非法。<br/>
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is
active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version
transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed.
After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as
invalid.<br/>
Sounds like this would cause issues with pre-signed time locked transactions.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
==Deployment==
协议升级,将分成三步逐步实施。并有一个可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an
optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点使用 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点在监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016
个区块均发送了相同的支持信号,进入下一阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第一个宽限期 2016 的区块后,且总信号区块超过了
2218/4032,就开始使用新的区块版本打包区块,并同时开始孤立旧版本。此时所有节点和钱包,将可以使用新版本号发送交易,同时兼容旧版本号交易。<br/>
3. 钱包节点升级。在挖矿节点监测到第二个宽限期 4032
个连续的新版本的区块后,开始拒绝旧版本号的交易,只打包/转播新版本号的交易。同时将从内存池中删除旧版本号的交易。<br/>
4.
(可选的)协议升级。在第三阶段中包含有第四阶段的升级代码。当我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本交易后,必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。则此时可以通过矿工节点投票的方式完成全网络的协议升级。
1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be
activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks
and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting
blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old
versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new
versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>
3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new
versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old
versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and
included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged
from memory pools.<br/>
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol
upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes
upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol
upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and
finish this upgrade.<br/>
至此,协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需要多数的矿工发信号后即可激活。在中本聪的比特币论文中,99.9% 的可能性下,55% 的矿工将在 340
个区块后确保成为最长链。这将最大可能减小通过控制少数算力而拖延网络升级的可能性。我们可以预见到在算力信号超过 51%
后,挖矿节点将迅速的在第一个宽限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 在两个宽限期内,钱包节点交易不受影响,有足够的时间升级钱包软件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含在 block header 中,并不影响 SPV 挖矿过程。(看起来是?)<br/>
4.
在两个宽限期后,钱包节点将必须升级钱包,否则因没有算力支持将无法发送交易,也无法确认。相对于在节点间重新达成新的共识,这种状况并没有更糟糕。<br/>
5. 钱包节点的账本将得到尊重和保护。使用链下钱包的用户将需要在钱包服务提供商的声明之后决定提至链上钱包或跟随。<br/>
6.
将来的协议升级,可以在升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激活投票。这将预留足够的时间让节点升级软件以支持新的协议。即使矿工投票激活失败也不影响现状。<br/>
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in
the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after
340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of
delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We
can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the
first grace period. <br/>
Technically soft forks can be implemented at 55% hashpower already
without an orphaning period(like BIP16). Those that don't upgrade
would just be at risk of mining invalid blocks. One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision since they can simply choose
to reject the fork and false signal.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be
affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
The widely deployed stratum based SPV mining does not really provide a
proper way to validate nversion of the previous block, it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they
cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new
consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
Previous consensus changes have largely been done in backwards
compatible ways which lets users opt-in to new features. In general
backwards compatibility is considered a good thing, this seems to make
that worse.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users
of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service
providers after they got the public notification from the service providers.
<br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of
nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There
would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new
protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will
not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3.
钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4.
存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the
longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary
fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the
perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false
signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the
signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the
miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
Miners can simply announce they are false signalling with coinbase
tags and other methods. This activation method would likely not be
viable for controversial changes.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new
protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished,
genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
Users would likely take into account markets and other factors when
deciding what to do, the total number of nodes doesn't really matter
much. Miner signalling is not necessarily indicative of economic and
user support.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol
consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most
passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Jared Lee Richardson via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 01:08:49 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
and allows for resource requirements
that are too high for many users to validate. The block size settings
there are effectively placebo controls.
Right, but that's my point. Any level of control the fullnodes believe
they have is effectively a placebo, unless the opposition to the miners is
essentially unanimous (and maybe not even then, if the chainsplit doesn't
have any miners to get to the next difficulty change or gets attacked
repeatedly).
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
I'm advocating that resource requirements be low
enough that full validation remains possible for a large percentage of
the economy.
We're derailed from the main thread at this point, but just wanted to state
that I agree in part. The part I don't agree with is when a single
transaction begins to cost more than a month's worth of full validation,
which has already happened at least once last week, the full validation is
on its way to becoming worthless. The two costs have to be balanced for
the coin to have utility for its users.

I agree with the rest.

Jared
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:35 PM, Jared Lee Richardson
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
What you're describing is effectively the same as BU.
BU by default uses an "Accept Depth" parameter which effectively lets
miners decide block size rules and allows for resource requirements
that are too high for many users to validate. The block size settings
there are effectively placebo controls.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Nodes follow chains, they do not decide the victor. The average user
follows the default of the software, which is to follow the longest valid
chain. Forcing the average user to decide which software to run is far
more
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
valuable than allowing "the software" to decide things, when in fact all
it
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
will do is decide the previous default.
That's largely true that they typically don't decide the victor in
soft forks unless they are the ones to activate the rules
changes(satoshi did this a few times in the early days), however they
make it very difficult for a hard fork to be activated without
consent. Yes, I'm not advocating for having runtime consensus settings
for nodes either, I'm advocating that resource requirements be low
enough that full validation remains possible for a large percentage of
the economy.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision
This is true and a good point. A false signal from miners could trick
the
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
honest miners into forking off prematurely with a minority.
More likely the false signal would be used during the orphaning period
to prevent blocks from being orphaned for miners that don't want to
follow the fork.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
This is the job of the stratum server and the pool operator. These are
distinct responsibilities; Miners should choose a pool operator in line
with
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
their desires. Solo mining is basically dead, as it will never again be
practical(and has not been for at least 2 years) for the same hardware
that
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
does the mining to also do full node operation.
If the pool operator/stratum server also does not do validation, then any
number of problems could occur.
Yes, there is a good amount of risk with validationless mining right
now here since it's well known that over half of mining pools use
validationless mining to some degree. This may not be too bad though
due to fallbacks but the risk is probably fairly implementation
specific.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:44 PM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 9:23 PM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing
or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining
nodes.
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
They should beware that the rule has been changed.
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all
miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes
must
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then
the final
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded
codes.
<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>
==Summary==
本方法并䞍是来源于䞪人而是䞭文比特垁瀟区䞭集䜓智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of
collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different
interest
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
groups.<br/>
这是䞀种圚协议升级时对党眑挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保技和激励的方法避免䞍参䞎挖矿的节点没有升级的劚力而受到损倱。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes
and
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive
mechanism,
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain
splitting.<br/>
发信号的倚数矿工圚蟟到激掻条件后第䞀䞪宜限期䞀䞪隟床呚期后讟眮新区块版本号孀立未升级矿工的䜎版本号的块。
通过最初的䞭本聪共识圚第䞀䞪宜限期结束后所有矿工将升级至最新版本或䜿甚最新版本。圚第二䞪宜限期䞀䞪隟床呚期后矿工将仅接受新版本的亀易
未升级的客户端发送的旧版本亀易将无法埗到新节点的蜬播也无法进入新版本区块。这将圚保技甚户资产的同时提醒䞍挖矿的钱包节点升级。
并圚升级代码䞭加入对协议进行改劚的郚分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投祚实斜该项改劚以蟟成协议改劚的广泛郚眲。<br/>
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new
block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of
2016
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms
of the
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all
mining
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the second
grace
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes will only
accept
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes not
upgrading
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new versionbits. This
will
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing replay attack and
will
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
function as a notification for them to upgrade. Codes dealing with
protocol
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After the non-mining node
upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the protocol upgrade and
this
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of the protocol
upgrade.<br/>
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
圚该项改劚广泛郚眲至客户端之后䟝然由其激掻条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently
even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>
==Motivation==
鉎于最初的比特垁协议并未考虑䞍参䞎挖矿的钱包节点富臎这些钱包节点的协议升级是被劚的懒惰的。
圓圚升级方向䞊出现分歧时矿工也䞍愿意圚错误的铟䞊挖矿䜆矿工又没有任䜕方法可以确保正圚延长的铟是被钱包节点广泛接受
的铟。这将圱响钱包节点的安党。<br/>
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not
consider
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that
upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy.
When
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners
have no
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely
accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the
security of
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
the wallet nodes.<br/>
Wallet nodes being able to fully validate and choose whether or not to
accept a particular chain is an important part of bitcoins security
model.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
䜿甚该方法可以圚保证钱包节点资产安党的情况䞋䞔通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。䞀旊钱包节点升级协议保证矿工节点䞍仅工䜜圚算力最长铟䞊
还工䜜圚比特垁生态环境䞭其他钱包节点所䜿甚的最长铟䞊。圚䞭本聪共识䞋䞍䌚出现分叉以实现析进匏的协议升级。<br/>
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Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method
can
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be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for
the
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wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the
miners'
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nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but
also on
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the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin
sphere.
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Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as
protocol
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upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
There is no way to guarantee a wallet node will accept a particular
block since that is always up to the user.
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==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将䜿甚 versionbits 版本䜍来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时所有区块需芁䜿甚制定的 nVersion
来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将䜿甚 tx version 来定义圓前的亀易版本。圓前的 tx version 是 1将允讞 tx version 䞺 2
的亀易并圚第二䞪宜限期之后䜿 tx version 䞺 1 的亀易非法。<br/>
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is
active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version
transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be
allowed.
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After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as
invalid.<br/>
Sounds like this would cause issues with pre-signed time locked transactions.
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==Deployment==
协议升级将分成䞉步逐步实斜。并有䞀䞪可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an
optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点䜿甚 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点圚监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016
䞪区块均发送了盞同的支持信号进入䞋䞀阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第䞀䞪宜限期 2016 的区块后䞔总信号区块超过了
2218/4032就匀始䜿甚新的区块版本打包区块并同时匀始孀立旧版本。歀时所有节点和钱包
将可以䜿甚新版本号发送亀易同时兌容旧版本号亀易。<br/>
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3. 钱包节点升级。圚挖矿节点监测到第二䞪宜限期 4032
䞪连续的新版本的区块后匀始拒绝旧版本号的亀易只打包蜬播新版本号的亀易。同时将从内存池䞭删陀旧版本号的亀易。<br/>
4.
可选的协议升级。圚第䞉阶段䞭包含有第四阶段的升级代码。圓我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本亀易后必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。
则歀时可以通过矿工节点投祚的方匏完成党眑络的协议升级。
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1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will
be
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activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016
blocks
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and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners
broadcasting
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blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with
old
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versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new
versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be
compatible.<br/>
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3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with
new
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versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old
versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and
included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely
purged
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from memory pools.<br/>
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol
upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining
nodes
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upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with
protocol
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upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and
finish this upgrade.<br/>
至歀协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需芁倚数的矿工发信号后即可激掻。圚䞭本聪的比特垁论文䞭99.9% 的可胜性䞋55% 的矿工将圚 340
䞪区块后确保成䞺最长铟。这将最倧可胜减小通过控制少数算力而拖延眑络升级的可胜性。我们可以预见到圚算力信号超过 51%
后挖矿节点将迅速的圚第䞀䞪宜限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 圚䞀䞪宜限期内钱包节点亀易䞍受圱响有足借的时闎升级钱包蜯件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含圚 block header 䞭并䞍圱响 SPV 挖矿过皋。看起来是<br/>
4.
圚䞀䞪宜限期后钱包节点将必须升级钱包吊则因没有算力支持将无法发送亀易也无法确讀。
盞对于圚节点闎重新蟟成新的共识这种状况并没有曎糟糕。<br/>
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5. 钱包节点的莊本将埗到尊重和保技。䜿甚铟䞋钱包的甚户将需芁圚钱包服务提䟛商的声明之后决定提至铟䞊钱包或跟随。<br/>
6.
将来的协议升级可以圚升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激掻投祚。这将预留足借的时闎让节点升级蜯件以支持新的协议。
即䜿矿工投祚激掻倱莥也䞍圱响现状。<br/>
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1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described
in
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the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest
chain after
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340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility
of
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delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing
power. We
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can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within
the
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first grace period. <br/>
Technically soft forks can be implemented at 55% hashpower already
without an orphaning period(like BIP16). Those that don't upgrade
would just be at risk of mining invalid blocks. One would not want to
use this method to try and activate a controversial hard fork since
it's trivial for miners to false signal. The orphaning period
effectively forces miners to make a decision but does not necessarily
force them to make a particular decision since they can simply choose
to reject the fork and false signal.
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2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be
affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY
mining.
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<br/>
The widely deployed stratum based SPV mining does not really provide a
proper way to validate nversion of the previous block, it only lets
you see the nversion of the current stratum job since you don't get a
full bock header. There's always a risk here that miners build on top
of invalid blocks when SPV mining.
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4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they
cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with
forming new
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consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
Previous consensus changes have largely been done in backwards
compatible ways which lets users opt-in to new features. In general
backwards compatibility is considered a good thing, this seems to make
that worse.
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5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved.
Users
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of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the
service
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providers after they got the public notification from the service
providers.
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<br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of
nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently.
There
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would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new
protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation
will
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not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波劚䌚圱响最长铟的结果。因歀越高的激掻比䟋芁求将减少短时闎分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可胜发假信号来避免被孀立䜆圚钱包节点看来无法区分是吊是假信号只胜升级。而钱包节点升级之后矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3.
钱包节点可胜发假信号来仅升级版本号而䞍支持绑定的协议升级代码䜆钱包节点数量无法刀别
䞥肃的真实节点应圓跟随可证实的矿工投祚结果。<br/>
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4.
存圚少郚分矿工和钱包节点共谋圚新协议升级激掻后䟝然䜿甚老协议挖矿的可胜。这种可胜随时发生无法杜绝
䜆通过让沉默的倧倚数钱包节点升级的方匏可以降䜎这种行䞺垊来的利益。<br/>
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1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the
longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of
temporary
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fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the
perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the
false
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signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption
that the
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signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded,
the
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miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
Miners can simply announce they are false signalling with coinbase
tags and other methods. This activation method would likely not be
viable for controversial changes.
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3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the
new
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protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished,
genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners
vote. <br/>
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Users would likely take into account markets and other factors when
deciding what to do, the total number of nodes doesn't really matter
much. Miner signalling is not necessarily indicative of economic and
user support.
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4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old
protocol
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consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through
most
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passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced.
<br/>
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==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
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https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 08:24:41 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Hi all the developers:

I must clarify that despite the general ideas comes from discussions with others. The opinion in replies are only limited to my self.

The old TXs can be re-enable after the fourth stage and just like **nothing happened** with the grace periods. The code can be provided with the protocol upgrade voting. At the end of the vote, either success or failed, we can have old TXs work again. It’s like after a long time that the block jammed. I think nobody get harmed (Is there? I’m not so sure about that), that’s the purpose.

Thank you for your time and kindly replies. Your opinions are more than welcome.

LIN Zheming
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes. They should beware that the rule has been changed.
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the final miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded codes.
<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>
==Summary==
本方法并不是来源于个人,而是中文比特币社区中集体智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different interest groups.<br/>
这是一种在协议升级时,对全网挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保护和激励的方法,避免不参与挖矿的节点没有升级的动力而受到损失。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes and non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive mechanism, the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain splitting.<br/>
发信号的多数矿工在达到激活条件后第一个宽限期(一个难度周期)后设置新区块版本号,孤立未升级矿工的低版本号的块。通过最初的中本聪共识,在第一个宽限期结束后,所有矿工将升级至最新版本或使用最新版本。在第二个宽限期(一个难度周期)后,矿工将仅接受新版本的交易,未升级的客户端发送的旧版本交易将无法得到新节点的转播也无法进入新版本区块。这将在保护用户资产的同时,提醒不挖矿的钱包节点升级。并在升级代码中加入对协议进行改动的部分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投票实施该项改动,以达成协议改动的广泛部署。<br/>
After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of 2016 blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms of the Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all mining nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the second grace period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes will only accept transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes not upgrading will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new versionbits. This will protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing replay attack and will function as a notification for them to upgrade. Codes dealing with protocol upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After the non-mining node upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the protocol upgrade and this will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of the protocol upgrade.<br/>
在该项改动广泛部署至客户端之后,依然由其激活条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>
==Motivation==
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of the wallet nodes.<br/>
使用该方法可以在保证钱包节点资产安全的情况下,且通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。一旦钱包节点升级协议,保证矿工节点不仅工作在算力最长链上,还工作在比特币生态环境中其他钱包节点所使用的最长链上。在中本聪共识下不会出现分叉,以实现渐进式的协议升级。<br/>
Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners' nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also on the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin sphere. Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as protocol upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将使用 versionbits 版本位来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时,所有区块需要使用制定的 nVersion 来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将使用 tx version 来定义当前的交易版本。当前的 tx version 是 1,将允许 tx version 为 2 的交易,并在第二个宽限期之后,使 tx version 为 1 的交易非法。<br/>
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed. After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as invalid.<br/>
==Deployment==
协议升级,将分成三步逐步实施。并有一个可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点使用 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点在监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016 个区块均发送了相同的支持信号,进入下一阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第一个宽限期 2016 的区块后,且总信号区块超过了 2218/4032,就开始使用新的区块版本打包区块,并同时开始孤立旧版本。此时所有节点和钱包,将可以使用新版本号发送交易,同时兼容旧版本号交易。<br/>
3. 钱包节点升级。在挖矿节点监测到第二个宽限期 4032 个连续的新版本的区块后,开始拒绝旧版本号的交易,只打包/转播新版本号的交易。同时将从内存池中删除旧版本号的交易。<br/>
4. (可选的)协议升级。在第三阶段中包含有第四阶段的升级代码。当我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本交易后,必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。则此时可以通过矿工节点投票的方式完成全网络的协议升级。
1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>
3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged from memory pools.<br/>
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and finish this upgrade.<br/>
至此,协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需要多数的矿工发信号后即可激活。在中本聪的比特币论文中,99.9% 的可能性下,55% 的矿工将在 340 个区块后确保成为最长链。这将最大可能减小通过控制少数算力而拖延网络升级的可能性。我们可以预见到在算力信号超过 51% 后,挖矿节点将迅速的在第一个宽限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 在两个宽限期内,钱包节点交易不受影响,有足够的时间升级钱包软件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含在 block header 中,并不影响 SPV 挖矿过程。(看起来是?)<br/>
4. 在两个宽限期后,钱包节点将必须升级钱包,否则因没有算力支持将无法发送交易,也无法确认。相对于在节点间重新达成新的共识,这种状况并没有更糟糕。<br/>
5. 钱包节点的账本将得到尊重和保护。使用链下钱包的用户将需要在钱包服务提供商的声明之后决定提至链上钱包或跟随。<br/>
6. 将来的协议升级,可以在升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激活投票。这将预留足够的时间让节点升级软件以支持新的协议。即使矿工投票激活失败也不影响现状。<br/>
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after 340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the first grace period. <br/>
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service providers after they got the public notification from the service providers. <br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4. 存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished, genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
==Implementation==
___TBD___
James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 10:20:11 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 3:24 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
I must clarify that despite the general ideas comes from discussions with others. The opinion in replies are only limited to my self.
The old TXs can be re-enable after the fourth stage and just like **nothing happened** with the grace periods. The code can be provided with the protocol upgrade voting. At the end of the vote, either success or failed, we can have old TXs work again. It’s like after a long time that the block jammed. I think nobody get harmed (Is there? I’m not so sure about that), that’s the purpose.
I think that would cause problems with systems like lightning network
that rely on reliable confirmations of transactions as part of their
security models.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Thank you for your time and kindly replies. Your opinions are more than welcome.
LIN Zheming
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
This method will incorporate any upgrade that affects non-mining nodes. They should beware that the rule has been changed.
TLDR: Major miners activate and orphan the minor. That ensures all miners upgrades. Then invalid the tx from not upgrading nodes. Nodes must upgrade (with other protocol upgrade codes) in order to work. Then the final miner vote over protocol upgrade, with all nodes has the same upgraded codes.
<pre>
BIP: ???
Title: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners
Author: LIN Zheming
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2017-06-12
</pre>
==Summary==
本方法并不是来源于个人,而是中文比特币社区中集体智慧的结果。<br/>
This idea was not created by an individual but is a product of collaboration in the Chinese bitcoin community between different interest groups.<br/>
这是一种在协议升级时,对全网挖矿和非挖矿节点进行保护和激励的方法,避免不参与挖矿的节点没有升级的动力而受到损失。<br/>
This method is put forth to incentivize and to protect mining nodes and non-mining nodes during protocol upgrading. With this incentive mechanism, the non-mining nodes will not suffer monetary loss from chain splitting.<br/>
发信号的多数矿工在达到激活条件后第一个宽限期(一个难度周期)后设置新区块版本号,孤立未升级矿工的低版本号的块。通过最初的中本聪共识,在第一个宽限期结束后,所有矿工将升级至最新版本或使用最新版本。在第二个宽限期(一个难度周期)后,矿工将仅接受新版本的交易,未升级的客户端发送的旧版本交易将无法得到新节点的转播也无法进入新版本区块。这将在保护用户资产的同时,提醒不挖矿的钱包节点升级。并在升级代码中加入对协议进行改动的部分。钱包升级后将由挖矿节点投票实施该项改动,以达成协议改动的广泛部署。<br/>
After the activation condition is met, majority miners will set a new block versionbits after the first grace period(a difficulty change of 2016 blocks). The blocks with lower versionbits will be orphaned. In terms of the Nakamoto Consensus, the end of the first grace period will force all mining nodes upgraded to signal a new version of consensus. After the second grace period ( a difficulty change of 2016 blocks), mining nodes will only accept transactions with new versionbits. Transactions from nodes not upgrading will not be relayed nor included in blocks with new versionbits. This will protect funds of non-mining nodes from utilizing replay attack and will function as a notification for them to upgrade. Codes dealing with protocol upgrade could be included in the upgrade. After the non-mining node upgrades, mining nodes will vote to activate the protocol upgrade and this will achieve the broad/widespread deployment of the protocol upgrade.<br/>
在该项改动广泛部署至客户端之后,依然由其激活条件控制。<br/>
The protocol upgrade depends on its activate condition independently even after the change deployed among nodes.<br/>
==Motivation==
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy. When there is disagreement in the direction of the upgrade, the miners have no mechanism to ensure that the chain being extended is the chain widely accepted by the wallet nodes. This also adversely affects the security of the wallet nodes.<br/>
使用该方法可以在保证钱包节点资产安全的情况下,且通过增加激励让钱包节点升级协议。一旦钱包节点升级协议,保证矿工节点不仅工作在算力最长链上,还工作在比特币生态环境中其他钱包节点所使用的最长链上。在中本聪共识下不会出现分叉,以实现渐进式的协议升级。<br/>
Apart from ensuring the asset security of wallet nodes, this method can be used to provide additional incentives to upgrade the protocol for the wallet nodes. Once the wallet nodes upgrade their protocol, the miners' nodes can be guaranteed to work - not only on the longest chain, but also on the longest chain used by other wallet nodes in the broader bitcoin sphere. Under the Nakamoto Consensus, there will be no persistent forks as protocol upgrades can be phased in.<br/>
==Specification==
1. 挖矿节点将使用 versionbits 版本位来定义支持信号。BIP 生效时,所有区块需要使用制定的 nVersion 来发送信号<br/>
2. 挖矿节点将使用 tx version 来定义当前的交易版本。当前的 tx version 是 1,将允许 tx version 为 2 的交易,并在第二个宽限期之后,使 tx version 为 1 的交易非法。<br/>
1. Mining nodes signal by setting a version bit. While this BIP is active, all blocks must set the chosen nVersion.<br/>
2. Mining nodes will use tx version to define current version transactions. Current tx version is 1, and tx version 2 will be allowed. After the second grace period, tx version 1 will be regarded as invalid.<br/>
==Deployment==
协议升级,将分成三步逐步实施。并有一个可选的第四步来集成协议升级代码。<br/>
Protocol upgrading will phase in over three stages. We can have an optional fourth stage to integrate codes of protocol upgrade.<br/>
1. 信号阶段。挖矿节点使用 versionbits 发送支持信号。挖矿节点在监测到 55% 的区块即前 1109/2016 个区块均发送了相同的支持信号,进入下一阶段。<br/>
2. 矿工节点升级。经过了第一个宽限期 2016 的区块后,且总信号区块超过了 2218/4032,就开始使用新的区块版本打包区块,并同时开始孤立旧版本。此时所有节点和钱包,将可以使用新版本号发送交易,同时兼容旧版本号交易。<br/>
3. 钱包节点升级。在挖矿节点监测到第二个宽限期 4032 个连续的新版本的区块后,开始拒绝旧版本号的交易,只打包/转播新版本号的交易。同时将从内存池中删除旧版本号的交易。<br/>
4. (可选的)协议升级。在第三阶段中包含有第四阶段的升级代码。当我们确保钱包节点升级到支持新版本交易后,必然包含了第四阶段的升级代码。则此时可以通过矿工节点投票的方式完成全网络的协议升级。
1. Signal stage: Mining nodes signal using BIP9. The next stage will be activated after 55% (1109) of 2016 blocks has the signal.<br/>
2. Mining nodes upgrade stage: After a first grace period of 2016 blocks and total signalling blocks passed 2218 of 4032 blocks, miners broadcasting blocks with new versionbits in block headers will orphan blocks with old versionbits. At this stage all nodes can send transactions with new versionbits, and transactions with old versionbits will be compatible.<br/>
3. Non-mining nodes upgrade stage: after 4032 continuous blocks with new versionbits, mining nodes will start to refuse transactions with old versionbits. Only transactions with new versionbits can be relayed and included in blocks. Transactions with old versionbits can be safely purged from memory pools.<br/>
4. (Optional)Protocol Upgrade stage: The codes dealing with protocol upgrade can be integrated in the third stage. After the non-mining nodes upgrades to support newer version of transactions, the codes with protocol upgrade must be included and now we can use miner vote to activate and finish this upgrade.<br/>
至此,协议升级完成。<br/>
At this point, the protocol upgrade have phased in.<br/>
==Benefits==
1. 仅需要多数的矿工发信号后即可激活。在中本聪的比特币论文中,99.9% 的可能性下,55% 的矿工将在 340 个区块后确保成为最长链。这将最大可能减小通过控制少数算力而拖延网络升级的可能性。我们可以预见到在算力信号超过 51% 后,挖矿节点将迅速的在第一个宽限期内进行升级。<br/>
2. 在两个宽限期内,钱包节点交易不受影响,有足够的时间升级钱包软件。<br/>
3. 版本信息包含在 block header 中,并不影响 SPV 挖矿过程。(看起来是?)<br/>
4. 在两个宽限期后,钱包节点将必须升级钱包,否则因没有算力支持将无法发送交易,也无法确认。相对于在节点间重新达成新的共识,这种状况并没有更糟糕。<br/>
5. 钱包节点的账本将得到尊重和保护。使用链下钱包的用户将需要在钱包服务提供商的声明之后决定提至链上钱包或跟随。<br/>
6. 将来的协议升级,可以在升级客户端版本同时绑定协议升级代码并进行独立的激活投票。这将预留足够的时间让节点升级软件以支持新的协议。即使矿工投票激活失败也不影响现状。<br/>
1. The activation only requires majority miners signal. As described in the paper by Satoshi Nakamoto, 55% miners will be in the longest chain after 340 blocks, with 99.9% certainty. This will minimize the possibility of delaying network upgrades by controlling a small number of hashing power. We can foresee that after 51% signalling, all miners will upgrade within the first grace period. <br/>
2. During the first two grace periods, non-mining nodes will not be affected. They have enough time to upgrade their software. <br/>
3. Versionbits included in block header, not influencing the SPY mining. <br/>
4. After two grace periods, all nodes must be upgraded. Otherwise they cannot send transactions or get any confirmations. Compared with forming new consensus among nodes, the situation is not worse than before. <br/>
5. The ledger in non-mining wallet nodes is honored and reserved. Users of off-chain wallet services can decide whether or not to follow the service providers after they got the public notification from the service providers. <br/>
6. Protocol upgrades in the future can be bonded with the upgrades of nodes, and the upgrades activate through miners vote independently. There would be enough time for nodes to be upgraded in order to support new protocols. Even in case of failing in miner activation, the situation will not worsen and the status quo will remain. <br/>
==Risks==
1. 算力的波动会影响最长链的结果。因此越高的激活比例要求将减少短时间分叉的危险。<br/>
2. 矿工可能发假信号来避免被孤立,但在钱包节点看来无法区分是否是假信号,只能升级。而钱包节点升级之后,矿工也将跟随。<br/>
3. 钱包节点可能发假信号来仅升级版本号而不支持绑定的协议升级代码,但钱包节点数量无法判别,严肃的真实节点应当跟随可证实的矿工投票结果。<br/>
4. 存在少部分矿工和钱包节点共谋,在新协议升级激活后依然使用老协议挖矿的可能。这种可能随时发生无法杜绝,但通过让沉默的大多数钱包节点升级的方式可以降低这种行为带来的利益。<br/>
1. The fluctuation of the hashing power will affect the result of the longest chain. Higher activating requirement means a lower risk of temporary fork. <br/>
2. Miners could simply signal to avoid being orphaned, but from the perspective of non-mining wallet nodes, they can't distinguish the false signal from the true signal. They must upgrade with the assumption that the signals are all true. After all the non-mining nodes have upgraded, the miners signalling false signal should follow. <br/>
3. Non-mining wallet nodes could false signal without supporting the new protocol but since the total number of nodes cannot be distinguished, genuine nodes should follow the proven result provided by miners vote. <br/>
4. Miners and non-mining nodes could conspire to fork using old protocol consensus. It can't be eliminated, just like in the past but through most passive non-mining nodes being upgraded, their benefit is reduced. <br/>
==Implementation==
___TBD___
_______________________________________________
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https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-13 18:11:39 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
Your English is much better than my Chinese. Thank you for taking the
time to write this.

I am still reading and trying to completely understand your proposal
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy.
This is not true. Non-mining wallet nodes were considered, and their
upgrade practices are not usually slower than miners.

Even in the very first version of the software it did not mine unless
the user went into the settings and explicitly turned it on or used a
command-line option. By default, every installation of Bitcoin was a
non-mining wallet node.

The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.

Frequently it is the miners that are "passive and lazy" in upgrading.
In some cases when new versions have had major improvements specific
to mining (such as for 0.8) miners upgraded much faster than other
nodes. But often, it is the other way around and miners adopt new
versions much slower than other nodes. If you look at block
construction today you will see that many miners are running highly
outdated node software which is more than one or even two years old.
(and as a result, they lose out on a considerable amount of
transaction fees.)

In fact, many miners have the most severe form of passive behavior:
they do not run a node at all but simply sell their hash power to
pools (which themselves are often slow to upgrade). By comparison,
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/branches.html 95%
of reachable nodes are running software now from the last year and a
half.

I do not, however, believe that it is a problem that anyone is slow to upgrade.

Reliability cannot be maintained in infrastructure if it is rapidly
changing. A normal deployment process for major systems
infrastructure outside of Bitcoin usually takes months because time
must be given to test and find bugs.

Miners depend on their income from mining and interruptions can be
very costly. Many pools are also involved with altcoins which are
constantly breaking and they have their attention directed elsewhere
and cannot quickly spare the time required to upgrade their software.
These delays are the natural consequence of a decentralized system
where no one has the power to force other people to adopt their
priorities.

If you look at the deployment processes of major internet protocols,
HTTP2, new versions of SSH, BGP, or IP itself you will find that
upgrades often happen slower than the entire life of Bitcoin so far--
and none of these protocols have the difficult consistency challenges
of Bitcoin or as much risk of irreparable financial loss if things go
wrong.

Because many people in the Bitcoin community appears to expect
upgrades much faster than even centralized ISP backbones upgrade their
router software I think they have unrealistic expectations with how
fast upgrading can occur while preserving stability, security, and
decentralization and unrealistic expectations of how fast upgrading
will occur so long as no one has the ability to force other people to
run their upgrades.

I look forward to competing my understanding of your proposal.

Cheers,
Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 16:39:42 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
Your English is much better than my Chinese. Thank you for taking the
time to write this.
I am still reading and trying to completely understand your proposal
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
鉴于最初的比特币协议并未考虑不参与挖矿的钱包节点,导致这些钱包节点的协议升级是被动的,懒惰的。当在升级方向上出现分歧时,矿工也不愿意在错误的链上挖矿,但矿工又没有任何方法可以确保正在延长的链是被钱包节点广泛接受的链。这将影响钱包节点的安全。<br/>
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy.
This is not true. Non-mining wallet nodes were considered, and their
upgrade practices are not usually slower than miners.
我针对的是懒惰和被动的节点,而非活跃做出选择的节点。用户愿意的话总是可以做出自己的选择。并没有办法来强迫并不认同的人形成共识。
I mean lazy and passive ones I addressed. Not the one actively chose whichever solution they like. Users always have their solution. There’s no way to force a union if they are not together.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Even in the very first version of the software it did not mine unless
the user went into the settings and explicitly turned it on or used a
command-line option. By default, every installation of Bitcoin was a
non-mining wallet node.
在中本聪白皮书中第五章的定义下,每个节点都需要挖矿。如果咱俩对此存在分歧,我并无法说服你。
From the definition of Satishi Nakamoto, Section 5, each node mines. If that’s the disagreement between us, there’s no more I can convince you.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的,用户永远都有选择,并可以抛弃那些节点。这个 BIP 并没有反对这些用户这么做。只有那些被动的钱包用户,他们需要知道必须做出一个选择。(而不是被动的跟随默认的策略)
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.

这个 BIP 可以被应用于几乎任何的升级上,包括隔离见证,两兆的隔离见证,两兆扩容,涌现共识,八兆扩容等。但这些升级并不是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m… but the upgrade is not the key point.

到底我们的用户是否真的拥有选择?
Did the users have any real choice?

我并不能理解他们相信大部分矿工(就像当前一样),但拒绝这些多数矿工对协议改变的投票结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.

对钱包用户的选择,是他们是否相信多数矿工。如果他们不相信,可以通过分叉来消除掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of miners.

如果他们仍旧相信矿工,那么可以留下来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.

所以问题在于:比特币的开发者、用户、拥有者、服务提供者、甚至矿工,是否(仍然)如白皮书中描述的对大多数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Frequently it is the miners that are "passive and lazy" in upgrading.
In some cases when new versions have had major improvements specific
to mining (such as for 0.8) miners upgraded much faster than other
nodes. But often, it is the other way around and miners adopt new
versions much slower than other nodes. If you look at block
construction today you will see that many miners are running highly
outdated node software which is more than one or even two years old.
(and as a result, they lose out on a considerable amount of
transaction fees.)
我个人将这种行为视作对当前版本的反对票。这个BIP也考虑了这种情况,您是否注意到矿工应该先升级(避免被孤立),这是否解决了你提出的问题呢?
I personally take that as VETO to current version. This BIP also address this situation. Did you notice that miners should be upgraded first? Did that solve the problem you mentioned above?

如果我们可以通过这个方法让所有矿工至少都要升级到相同的共识版本并开始对将来的升级投票,那应该不会有任何问题。除非矿工希望进行的投票,不是某些人希望看到的投票。
If we can use this method to at least make miners upgraded to the same consensus version and start to vote for the upcoming changes, that would solve the problem for the passive behavior. Unless the vote miners wish to hold, is not in the wishlist of someone.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
they do not run a node at all but simply sell their hash power to
pools (which themselves are often slow to upgrade). By comparison,
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/branches.html 95%
of reachable nodes are running software now from the last year and a
half.
I do not, however, believe that it is a problem that anyone is slow to upgrade.
Reliability cannot be maintained in infrastructure if it is rapidly
changing. A normal deployment process for major systems
infrastructure outside of Bitcoin usually takes months because time
must be given to test and find bugs.
Miners depend on their income from mining and interruptions can be
very costly. Many pools are also involved with altcoins which are
constantly breaking and they have their attention directed elsewhere
and cannot quickly spare the time required to upgrade their software.
These delays are the natural consequence of a decentralized system
where no one has the power to force other people to adopt their
priorities.
If you look at the deployment processes of major internet protocols,
HTTP2, new versions of SSH, BGP, or IP itself you will find that
upgrades often happen slower than the entire life of Bitcoin so far--
and none of these protocols have the difficult consistency challenges
of Bitcoin or as much risk of irreparable financial loss if things go
wrong.
Because many people in the Bitcoin community appears to expect
upgrades much faster than even centralized ISP backbones upgrade their
router software I think they have unrealistic expectations with how
fast upgrading can occur while preserving stability, security, and
decentralization and unrealistic expectations of how fast upgrading
will occur so long as no one has the ability to force other people to
run their upgrades.
I look forward to competing my understanding of your proposal.
Cheers,
I think the divergency is from the different definition of bitcoin. If no common understanding, let’s get one from the white paper, together.

Regards

LIN Zheming
Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 17:20:32 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The BIP is described using Chinese and English. If any part is missing
or need more specific, please reply. Forgive for my poor English.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Your English is much better than my Chinese. Thank you for taking the
time to write this.
I am still reading and trying to completely understand your proposal
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
鉎于最初的比特垁协议并未考虑䞍参䞎挖矿的钱包节点富臎这些钱包节点的协议升级是被劚的懒惰的。
圓圚升级方向䞊出现分歧时矿工也䞍愿意圚错误的铟䞊挖矿䜆矿工又没有任䜕方法可以确保正圚延长的铟是被钱包节点广泛接受
的铟。这将圱响钱包节点的安党。<br/>
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
In view of the fact that the original Bitcoin consensus did not
consider the non-mining wallet nodes(as mentioned above), the result is
that upgrading the consensus of these wallet nodes is passive and lazy.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
This is not true. Non-mining wallet nodes were considered, and their
upgrade practices are not usually slower than miners.
我针对的是懒惰和被劚的节点而非掻跃做出选择的节点。甚户愿意的话总是可以做出自己的选择。并没有办法来区迫并䞍讀同的人圢成共识。
I mean lazy and passive ones I addressed. Not the one actively chose
whichever solution they like. Users always have their solution. There’s no
way to force a union if they are not together.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Even in the very first version of the software it did not mine unless
the user went into the settings and explicitly turned it on or used a
command-line option. By default, every installation of Bitcoin was a
non-mining wallet node.
圚䞭本聪癜皮乊䞭第五章的定义䞋每䞪节点郜需芁挖矿。劂果咱俩对歀存圚分歧我并无法诎服䜠。
From the definition of Satishi Nakamoto, Section 5, each node mines. If
that’s the disagreement between us, there’s no more I can convince you.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的甚户氞远郜有选择并可以抛匃那些节点。这䞪 BIP 并没有反对这些甚户这么做。只有那些被劚的钱包甚户
他们需芁知道必须做出䞀䞪选择。而䞍是被劚的跟随默讀的策略
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP
does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s
passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.
这䞪 BIP 可以被应甚于几乎任䜕的升级䞊包括隔犻见证䞀兆的隔犻见证䞀兆扩容涌现共识八兆扩容等。䜆这些升级并䞍是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x,
2m, ec, 8m
 but the upgrade is not the key point.
到底我们的甚户是吊真的拥有选择
Did the users have any real choice?
我并䞍胜理解他们盞信倧郚分矿工就像圓前䞀样䜆拒绝这些倚数矿工对协议改变的投祚结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today)
but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the
term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a
feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that
they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too
"passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users
may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not
show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
对钱包甚户的选择是他们是吊盞信倚数矿工。劂果他们䞍盞信可以通过分叉来消陀掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51%
majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of
miners.
劂果他们仍旧盞信矿工那么可以留䞋来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for
upcoming protocol upgrade.
所以问题圚于比特垁的匀发者、甚户、拥有者、服务提䟛者、甚至矿工是吊仍然劂癜皮乊䞭描述的对倧倚数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service
provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as
designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper
refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to
determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/
chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the
correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid
chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners
(or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they
wish to enforce.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Frequently it is the miners that are "passive and lazy" in upgrading.
In some cases when new versions have had major improvements specific
to mining (such as for 0.8) miners upgraded much faster than other
nodes. But often, it is the other way around and miners adopt new
versions much slower than other nodes. If you look at block
construction today you will see that many miners are running highly
outdated node software which is more than one or even two years old.
(and as a result, they lose out on a considerable amount of
transaction fees.)
我䞪人将这种行䞺视䜜对圓前版本的反对祚。这䞪BIP也考虑了这种情况悚是吊泚意到矿工应该先升级避免被孀立这是吊解决了䜠提出的问题呢
I personally take that as VETO to current version. This BIP also address
this situation. Did you notice that miners should be upgraded first? Did
that solve the problem you mentioned above?
劂果我们可以通过这䞪方法让所有矿工至少郜芁升级到盞同的共识版本并匀始对将来的升级投祚那应该䞍䌚有任䜕问题。
陀非矿工垌望进行的投祚䞍是某些人垌望看到的投祚。
If we can use this method to at least make miners upgraded to the same
consensus version and start to vote for the upcoming changes, that would
solve the problem for the passive behavior. Unless the vote miners wish to
hold, is not in the wishlist of someone.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
they do not run a node at all but simply sell their hash power to
pools (which themselves are often slow to upgrade). By comparison,
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/branches.html 95%
of reachable nodes are running software now from the last year and a
half.
I do not, however, believe that it is a problem that anyone is slow to
upgrade.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Reliability cannot be maintained in infrastructure if it is rapidly
changing. A normal deployment process for major systems
infrastructure outside of Bitcoin usually takes months because time
must be given to test and find bugs.
Miners depend on their income from mining and interruptions can be
very costly. Many pools are also involved with altcoins which are
constantly breaking and they have their attention directed elsewhere
and cannot quickly spare the time required to upgrade their software.
These delays are the natural consequence of a decentralized system
where no one has the power to force other people to adopt their
priorities.
If you look at the deployment processes of major internet protocols,
HTTP2, new versions of SSH, BGP, or IP itself you will find that
upgrades often happen slower than the entire life of Bitcoin so far--
and none of these protocols have the difficult consistency challenges
of Bitcoin or as much risk of irreparable financial loss if things go
wrong.
Because many people in the Bitcoin community appears to expect
upgrades much faster than even centralized ISP backbones upgrade their
router software I think they have unrealistic expectations with how
fast upgrading can occur while preserving stability, security, and
decentralization and unrealistic expectations of how fast upgrading
will occur so long as no one has the ability to force other people to
run their upgrades.
I look forward to competing my understanding of your proposal.
Cheers,
I think the divergency is from the different definition of bitcoin. If no
common understanding, let’s get one from the white paper, together.
Regards
LIN Zheming
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 18:55:04 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的甚户氞远郜有选择并可以抛匃那些节点。这䞪 BIP 并没有反对这些甚户这么做。只有那些被劚的钱包甚户他们需芁知
道必须做出䞀䞪选择。而䞍是被劚的跟随默讀的策略
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP
does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s
passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.
这䞪 BIP 可以被应甚于几乎任䜕的升级䞊包括隔犻见证䞀兆的隔犻见证䞀兆扩容涌现共识八兆扩容等。䜆这些升级并䞍是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit,
Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m
 but the upgrade is not the key point.
到底我们的甚户是吊真的拥有选择
Did the users have any real choice?
我并䞍胜理解他们盞信倧郚分矿工就像圓前䞀样䜆拒绝这些倚数矿工对协议改变的投祚结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today)
but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the
term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a
feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that
they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too
"passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users
may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not
show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest
an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree
with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number
of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to
signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing
that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is
pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that
the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter
of consensus rules.

Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described
as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no
actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating
node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what
rules other entities are enforcing.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
对钱包甚户的选择是他们是吊盞信倚数矿工。劂果他们䞍盞信可以通过分叉来消陀掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51%
majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of
miners.
劂果他们仍旧盞信矿工那么可以留䞋来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for
upcoming protocol upgrade.
所以问题圚于比特垁的匀发者、甚户、拥有者、服务提䟛者、甚至矿工是吊仍然劂癜皮乊䞭描述的对倧倚数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service
provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as
designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white
paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to
determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/
chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the
correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid
chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners
(or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they
wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1
temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can
leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop
confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a
soft fork, yes.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
Regards
LIN Zheming
Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 19:04:21 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
Êǵģ¬Óû§ÓÀÔ¶¶ŒÓÐÑ¡Ôñ£¬²¢¿ÉÒÔÅ×ÆúÄÇЩœÚµã¡£Õâžö BIP ²¢Ã»ÓзŽ¶ÔÕâЩÓû§ÕâÃŽ×ö¡£Ö»ÓÐÄÇЩ±»¶¯µÄÇ®°üÓû§£¬ËûÃÇÐèÒªÖªµÀ±ØÐë×ö³öÒ»žöÑ¡Ôñ¡££š¶ø²»ÊDZ»¶¯µÄžúËæĬÈϵIJßÂÔ£©
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does¡¯t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that¡¯s passive, they need to know there¡¯s a choice and pick one.
Õâžö BIP ¿ÉÒÔ±»ÓŠÓÃÓÚŒžºõÈκεÄÉýŒ¶ÉÏ£¬°üÀšžôÀëŒûÖ€£¬ÁœÕ׵ĞôÀëŒûÖ€£¬ÁœÕ×À©ÈÝ£¬Ó¿ÏÖ¹²Ê¶£¬°ËÕ×À©Èݵȡ£µ«ÕâЩÉýŒ¶²¢²»ÊÇÖص㡣
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m¡­ but the upgrade is not the key point.
µœµ×ÎÒÃǵÄÓû§ÊÇ·ñÕæµÄÓµÓÐÑ¡Ôñ£¿
Did the users have any real choice?
ÎÒ²¢²»ÄÜÀíœâËûÃÇÏàÐŎ󲿷ֿ󹀣šŸÍÏñµ±Ç°Ò»Ñù£©£¬µ«ŸÜŸøÕâЩ¶àÊý¿ó¹€¶ÔЭÒéžÄ±äµÄͶƱœá¹û¡£
I don¡¯t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the ¡°vote¡± is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
¡°Sybil attack¡±. The genuine node will leave the chain if it doesn¡¯t like the change. That¡¯s what restrain the majority miners acting foolishly.

If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don¡¯t the fork away(and not afraid of replay attack). I think it¡¯s a way to move forward together.

Would you support the idea that we put the choice to the users to decide?
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing.
¶ÔÇ®°üÓû§µÄÑ¡Ôñ£¬ÊÇËûÃÇÊÇ·ñÏàÐŶàÊý¿ó¹€¡£Èç¹ûËûÃDz»ÏàÐÅ£¬¿ÉÒÔÍš¹ý·Ö²æÀŽÏû³ýµô¿ó¹€¡£
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don¡¯t, they can have their fork that get rid of miners.
Èç¹ûËûÃÇÈÔŸÉÏàÐÅ¿ó¹€£¬ÄÇÃŽ¿ÉÒÔÁôÏÂÀŽ²¢žúËæ¿ó¹€œ«ÀŽµÄЭÒéžÄ±ä¡£
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
ËùÒÔÎÊÌâÔÚÓÚ£º±ÈÌرҵĿª·¢Õß¡¢Óû§¡¢ÓµÓÐÕß¡¢·þÎñÌṩÕß¡¢ÉõÖÁ¿ó¹€£¬ÊÇ·ñ£šÈÔÈ»£©Èç°×Æ€ÊéÖÐÃèÊöµÄ¶ÔŽó¶àÊý¿ó¹€ÓµÓÐÐÅÈΡ£
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That¡¯s a ¡°soft fork¡± right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fork, yes.
And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a ¡°soft fork¡±?


Regards,

LIN Zheming
Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 20:11:07 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的甚户氞远郜有选择并可以抛匃那些节点。这䞪 BIP 并没有反对这些甚户这么做。只有那些被劚的钱包甚户他们需芁知
道必须做出䞀䞪选择。而䞍是被劚的跟随默讀的策略
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP
does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s
passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.
这䞪 BIP 可以被应甚于几乎任䜕的升级䞊包括隔犻见证䞀兆的隔犻见证䞀兆扩容涌现共识八兆扩容等。䜆这些升级并䞍是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit,
Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m
 but the upgrade is not the key point.
到底我们的甚户是吊真的拥有选择
Did the users have any real choice?
我并䞍胜理解他们盞信倧郚分矿工就像圓前䞀样䜆拒绝这些倚数矿工对协议改变的投祚结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today)
but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the
term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a
feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that
they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too
"passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users
may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not
show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly
suggest an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you
agree with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number
of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to
signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing
that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is
pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that
the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter
of consensus rules.
“Sybil attack”. The genuine node will leave the chain if it doesn’t like
the change. That’s what restrain the majority miners acting foolishly.
If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don’t the fork away(and
not afraid of replay attack). I think it’s a way to move forward together.
Would you support the idea that we put the choice to the users to decide?
The concept of "sybil attacks" doesn't really apply to enforcing
network-wide consensus changes. Even if someone spooled up 100 times more
nodes than currently exist and they all "signal" for some consensus rule
change, that doesn't compel the rest of the "genuine" nodes to change the
rules they enforce.

The users always have a choice with regard to what consensus rules to
enforce and what software to run. Everyone is welcome to propose changes
and write software that they make available to users.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described
as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no
actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating
node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what
rules other entities are enforcing.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
对钱包甚户的选择是他们是吊盞信倚数矿工。劂果他们䞍盞信可以通过分叉来消陀掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51%
majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of
miners.
劂果他们仍旧盞信矿工那么可以留䞋来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for
upcoming protocol upgrade.
所以问题圚于比特垁的匀发者、甚户、拥有者、服务提䟛者、甚至矿工是吊仍然劂癜皮乊䞭描述的对倧倚数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service
provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as
designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white
paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to
determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/
chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the
correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid
chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners
(or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they
wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1
temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can
leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop
confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a
soft fork, yes.
And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a “soft fork”?
As far as I know - if you're only restricting the validation rules then it
should be a non-breaking change.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
Regards,
LIN Zheming
Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-16 14:39:26 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Will there be a ¡°Do nothing¡± soft fork, showing that the community can still moving forward?

So all the nodes get to upgrade to use tx version 2, and that avoid a chain split.

Are you support that or against that, why?

Regards,
LIN Zheming
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
Êǵģ¬Óû§ÓÀÔ¶¶ŒÓÐÑ¡Ôñ£¬²¢¿ÉÒÔÅ×ÆúÄÇЩœÚµã¡£Õâžö BIP ²¢Ã»ÓзŽ¶ÔÕâЩÓû§ÕâÃŽ×ö¡£Ö»ÓÐÄÇЩ±»¶¯µÄÇ®°üÓû§£¬ËûÃÇÐèÒªÖªµÀ±ØÐë×ö³öÒ»žöÑ¡Ôñ¡££š¶ø²»ÊDZ»¶¯µÄžúËæĬÈϵIJßÂÔ£©
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does¡¯t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that¡¯s passive, they need to know there¡¯s a choice and pick one.
Õâžö BIP ¿ÉÒÔ±»ÓŠÓÃÓÚŒžºõÈκεÄÉýŒ¶ÉÏ£¬°üÀšžôÀëŒûÖ€£¬ÁœÕ׵ĞôÀëŒûÖ€£¬ÁœÕ×À©ÈÝ£¬Ó¿ÏÖ¹²Ê¶£¬°ËÕ×À©Èݵȡ£µ«ÕâЩÉýŒ¶²¢²»ÊÇÖص㡣
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m¡­ but the upgrade is not the key point.
µœµ×ÎÒÃǵÄÓû§ÊÇ·ñÕæµÄÓµÓÐÑ¡Ôñ£¿
Did the users have any real choice?
ÎÒ²¢²»ÄÜÀíœâËûÃÇÏàÐŎ󲿷ֿ󹀣šŸÍÏñµ±Ç°Ò»Ñù£©£¬µ«ŸÜŸøÕâЩ¶àÊý¿ó¹€¶ÔЭÒéžÄ±äµÄͶƱœá¹û¡£
I don¡¯t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the ¡°vote¡± is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
¡°Sybil attack¡±. The genuine node will leave the chain if it doesn¡¯t like the change. That¡¯s what restrain the majority miners acting foolishly.
If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don¡¯t the fork away(and not afraid of replay attack). I think it¡¯s a way to move forward together.
Would you support the idea that we put the choice to the users to decide?
The concept of "sybil attacks" doesn't really apply to enforcing network-wide consensus changes. Even if someone spooled up 100 times more nodes than currently exist and they all "signal" for some consensus rule change, that doesn't compel the rest of the "genuine" nodes to change the rules they enforce.
The users always have a choice with regard to what consensus rules to enforce and what software to run. Everyone is welcome to propose changes and write software that they make available to users.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing.
¶ÔÇ®°üÓû§µÄÑ¡Ôñ£¬ÊÇËûÃÇÊÇ·ñÏàÐŶàÊý¿ó¹€¡£Èç¹ûËûÃDz»ÏàÐÅ£¬¿ÉÒÔÍš¹ý·Ö²æÀŽÏû³ýµô¿ó¹€¡£
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don¡¯t, they can have their fork that get rid of miners.
Èç¹ûËûÃÇÈÔŸÉÏàÐÅ¿ó¹€£¬ÄÇÃŽ¿ÉÒÔÁôÏÂÀŽ²¢žúËæ¿ó¹€œ«ÀŽµÄЭÒéžÄ±ä¡£
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
ËùÒÔÎÊÌâÔÚÓÚ£º±ÈÌرҵĿª·¢Õß¡¢Óû§¡¢ÓµÓÐÕß¡¢·þÎñÌṩÕß¡¢ÉõÖÁ¿ó¹€£¬ÊÇ·ñ£šÈÔÈ»£©Èç°×Æ€ÊéÖÐÃèÊöµÄ¶ÔŽó¶àÊý¿ó¹€ÓµÓÐÐÅÈΡ£
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That¡¯s a ¡°soft fork¡± right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fork, yes.
And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a ¡°soft fork¡±?
As far as I know - if you're only restricting the validation rules then it should be a non-breaking change.
Regards,
LIN Zheming
Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-15 05:04:30 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的甚户氞远郜有选择并可以抛匃那些节点。这䞪 BIP 并没有反对这些甚户这么做。只有那些被劚的钱包甚户他们需芁知道必须做出䞀䞪选择。而䞍是被劚的跟随默讀的策略
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.
这䞪 BIP 可以被应甚于几乎任䜕的升级䞊包括隔犻见证䞀兆的隔犻见证䞀兆扩容涌现共识八兆扩容等。䜆这些升级并䞍是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m
 but the upgrade is not the key point.
到底我们的甚户是吊真的拥有选择
Did the users have any real choice?
我并䞍胜理解他们盞信倧郚分矿工就像圓前䞀样䜆拒绝这些倚数矿工对协议改变的投祚结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been arguably flawed.
There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequitable in the context of Bitcoin.

The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a voice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems in which they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, and they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. This is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individual participation would allow.

Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a state. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have left the consensus - you have no say.

Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.

To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot control miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control the economy's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must participate in the respective operation.

e
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
对钱包甚户的选择是他们是吊盞信倚数矿工。劂果他们䞍盞信可以通过分叉来消陀掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of miners.
劂果他们仍旧盞信矿工那么可以留䞋来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
所以问题圚于比特垁的匀发者、甚户、拥有者、服务提䟛者、甚至矿工是吊仍然劂癜皮乊䞭描述的对倧倚数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fork, yes.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Regards
LIN Zheming
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-15 18:38:57 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?

I had proposed earlier and maintain that "UTXO bits" can be used to allow
coordinated user participation activation thresholds akin to other
hashpower thresholds.

https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html

While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or was just too
complicated and concerned with compression at the expense of readability),
I am fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - would be a
reasonable way for users to coordinate changes independently of miners and
with very high consensus levels.


On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的甚户氞远郜有选择并可以抛匃那些节点。这䞪 BIP 并没有反对这些甚户这么做。只有那些被劚的钱包甚户他们需芁知
道必须做出䞀䞪选择。而䞍是被劚的跟随默讀的策略
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP
does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s
passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.
这䞪 BIP 可以被应甚于几乎任䜕的升级䞊包括隔犻见证䞀兆的隔犻见证䞀兆扩容涌现共识八兆扩容等。䜆这些升级并䞍是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit,
Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m
 but the upgrade is not the key point.
到底我们的甚户是吊真的拥有选择
Did the users have any real choice?
我并䞍胜理解他们盞信倧郚分矿工就像圓前䞀样䜆拒绝这些倚数矿工对协议改变的投祚结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today)
but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the
term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a
feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that
they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too
"passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users
may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not
show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly
suggest an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you
agree with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number
of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to
signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing
that to date has been arguably flawed.
There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the
protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor
inequitable in the context of Bitcoin.
The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a
voice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems
in which they vote using their existence as power, not their participation,
and they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others.
This is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a
more powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individual
participation would allow.
Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a
state. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are
satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have left the
consensus - you have no say.
Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never
participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these
people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your
say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.
To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received
in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say
regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks
cannot control miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control
the economy's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either
one must participate in the respective operation.
e
Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely
impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin
users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described
as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no
actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating
node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what
rules other entities are enforcing.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
对钱包甚户的选择是他们是吊盞信倚数矿工。劂果他们䞍盞信可以通过分叉来消陀掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51%
majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of
miners.
劂果他们仍旧盞信矿工那么可以留䞋来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for
upcoming protocol upgrade.
所以问题圚于比特垁的匀发者、甚户、拥有者、服务提䟛者、甚至矿工是吊仍然劂癜皮乊䞭描述的对倧倚数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service
provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as
designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white
paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to
determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/
chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the
correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid
chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners
(or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they
wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1
temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can
leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop
confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a
soft fork, yes.
Post by Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev
Regards
LIN Zheming
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-16 03:09:33 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Seems functional as a way for the economy to signal, but signaling is only an expression of intent to participate, not actual participation. One can signal and then not participate, as we see with hash rate signaling.

Today we see people complaining about miner control, because hash rate is centralized. Tomorrow we are likely to see people complaining about economic control, as its centralization continues.

So imagine a few web wallets/APIs signaling based on their ownership of the major fraction of value. Can potential splitters safely rely on these signals? The wallets have a voice because they participate.

Consider also that user activated soft forks are not followed by unmodified nodes (on the presumption of minority hash rate support that necessitated the economic activation). In other words, they exhibit the categorical behavior of hard forks (incompatibility). So to the extent that the economy has control, it is only over the ability to hard fork (split the chain).

e
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I had proposed earlier and maintain that "UTXO bits" can be used to allow coordinated user participation activation thresholds akin to other hashpower thresholds.
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html
While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or was just too complicated and concerned with compression at the expense of readability), I am fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - would be a reasonable way for users to coordinate changes independently of miners and with very high consensus levels.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
是的甚户氞远郜有选择并可以抛匃那些节点。这䞪 BIP 并没有反对这些甚户这么做。只有那些被劚的钱包甚户他们需芁知道必须做出䞀䞪选择。而䞍是被劚的跟随默讀的策略
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one.
这䞪 BIP 可以被应甚于几乎任䜕的升级䞊包括隔犻见证䞀兆的隔犻见证䞀兆扩容涌现共识八兆扩容等。䜆这些升级并䞍是重点。
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m
 but the upgrade is not the key point.
到底我们的甚户是吊真的拥有选择
Did the users have any real choice?
我并䞍胜理解他们盞信倧郚分矿工就像圓前䞀样䜆拒绝这些倚数矿工对协议改变的投祚结果。
I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?
I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?
I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?
Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been arguably flawed.
There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequitable in the context of Bitcoin.
The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a voice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems in which they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, and they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. This is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individual participation would allow.
Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a state. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have left the consensus - you have no say.
Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.
To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot control miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control the economy's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must participate in the respective operation.
e
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
对钱包甚户的选择是他们是吊盞信倚数矿工。劂果他们䞍盞信可以通过分叉来消陀掉矿工。
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of miners.
劂果他们仍旧盞信矿工那么可以留䞋来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
所以问题圚于比特垁的匀发者、甚户、拥有者、服务提䟛者、甚至矿工是吊仍然劂癜皮乊䞭描述的对倧倚数矿工拥有信任。
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as always.
From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fork, yes.
Post by Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
Regards
LIN Zheming
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Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-07-22 03:58:21 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
I think we should not switch to Proof of Stake system.

in Proof of Stake system, the one with more voting power tend to protect
their investment and that will stop others from competing with them. they
will use the voting power to make entering barrier, limiting the
competition is bad for bitcoin economy (I believe).

Miners are not centralized, they just grow bigger and be industrialized,
but there's still a lot of competition. The competition is the main
security model of bitcoin system.

When we are talking about "security" in bitcoin system, we are talking
about the probability that a transaction revert or change. We can not be
100% sure under 3 confirmations, but in 6 or more confirmations, we think
the cash received is safe and can't be taken away. That's the security
provided by bitcoin system.

Hard fork is not dangerous, when hard fork happens, people can wait for a
short time (like maintenance of a POS/CreditCard system). When the chain
with most hashrate wins (with high enough probability), we can then safely
assume that the longest chain can't be reverted.


Regards,
LIN Zheming

Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
2017-06-14 18:30:32 UTC
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is
critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security
would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
Êǵģ¬Óû§ÓÀÔ¶¶ŒÓÐÑ¡Ôñ£¬²¢¿ÉÒÔÅ×ÆúÄÇЩœÚµã¡£Õâžö BIP ²¢Ã»ÓзŽ¶ÔÕâЩÓû§ÕâÃŽ×ö¡£Ö»ÓÐÄÇЩ±»¶¯µÄÇ®°üÓû§£¬ËûÃÇÐèÒªÖªµÀ±ØÐë×ö³öÒ»žöÑ¡Ôñ¡££š¶ø²»ÊDZ»¶¯µÄžúËæĬÈϵIJßÂÔ£©
Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does¡¯t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that¡¯s passive, they need to know there¡¯s a choice and pick one.
Õâžö BIP ¿ÉÒÔ±»ÓŠÓÃÓÚŒžºõÈκεÄÉýŒ¶ÉÏ£¬°üÀšžôÀëŒûÖ€£¬ÁœÕ׵ĞôÀëŒûÖ€£¬ÁœÕ×À©ÈÝ£¬Ó¿ÏÖ¹²Ê¶£¬°ËÕ×À©Èݵȡ£µ«ÕâЩÉýŒ¶²¢²»ÊÇÖص㡣
This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m¡­ but the upgrade is not the key point.
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Did the users have any real choice?
ÎÒ²¢²»ÄÜÀíœâËûÃÇÏàÐŎ󲿷ֿ󹀣šŸÍÏñµ±Ç°Ò»Ñù£©£¬µ«ŸÜŸøÕâЩ¶àÊý¿ó¹€¶ÔЭÒéžÄ±äµÄͶƱœá¹û¡£
I don¡¯t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?

I agree with you that the ¡°vote¡± is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?

I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?
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This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don¡¯t, they can have their fork that get rid of miners.
Èç¹ûËûÃÇÈÔŸÉÏàÐÅ¿ó¹€£¬ÄÇÃŽ¿ÉÒÔÁôÏÂÀŽ²¢žúËæ¿ó¹€œ«ÀŽµÄЭÒéžÄ±ä¡£
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
ËùÒÔÎÊÌâÔÚÓÚ£º±ÈÌرҵĿª·¢Õß¡¢Óû§¡¢ÓµÓÐÕß¡¢·þÎñÌṩÕß¡¢ÉõÖÁ¿ó¹€£¬ÊÇ·ñ£šÈÔÈ»£©Èç°×Æ€ÊéÖÐÃèÊöµÄ¶ÔŽó¶àÊý¿ó¹€ÓµÓÐÐÅÈΡ£
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.
Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That¡¯s a ¡°soft fork¡± right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as always.


Regards

LIN Zheming
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