Discussion:
Capacity increases for the Bitcoin system.
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Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-07 22:02:17 UTC
Permalink
The Scaling Bitcoin Workshop in HK is just wrapping up. Many fascinating
proposals were presented. I think this would be a good time to share my
view of the near term arc for capacity increases in the Bitcoin system. I
believe we’re in a fantastic place right now and that the community
is ready to deliver on a clear forward path with a shared vision that
addresses the needs of the system while upholding its values.

I think it’s important to first clearly express some of the relevant
principles that I think should guide the ongoing development of the
Bitcoin system.

Bitcoin is P2P electronic cash that is valuable over legacy systems
because of the monetary autonomy it brings to its users through
decentralization. Bitcoin seeks to address the root problem with
conventional currency: all the trust that's required to make it work--

-- Not that justified trust is a bad thing, but trust makes systems
brittle, opaque, and costly to operate. Trust failures result in systemic
collapses, trust curation creates inequality and monopoly lock-in, and
naturally arising trust choke-points can be abused to deny access to
due process. Through the use of cryptographic proof and decentralized
networks Bitcoin minimizes and replaces these trust costs.

With the available technology, there are fundamental trade-offs between
scale and decentralization. If the system is too costly people will be
forced to trust third parties rather than independently enforcing the
system's rules. If the Bitcoin blockchain’s resource usage, relative
to the available technology, is too great, Bitcoin loses its competitive
advantages compared to legacy systems because validation will be too
costly (pricing out many users), forcing trust back into the system.
If capacity is too low and our methods of transacting too inefficient,
access to the chain for dispute resolution will be too costly, again
pushing trust back into the system.

Since Bitcoin is an electronic cash, it _isn't_ a generic database;
the demand for cheap highly-replicated perpetual storage is unbounded,
and Bitcoin cannot and will not satisfy that demand for non-ecash
(non-Bitcoin) usage, and there is no shame in that. Fortunately, Bitcoin
can interoperate with other systems that address other applications,
and--with luck and hard work--the Bitcoin system can and will satisfy
the world's demand for electronic cash.

Fortunately, a lot of great technology is in the works that make
navigating the trade-offs easier.

First up: after several years in the making Bitcoin Core has recently
merged libsecp256k1, which results in a huge increase in signature
validation performance. Combined with other recent work we're now getting
ConnectTip performance 7x higher in 0.12 than in prior versions. This
has been a long time coming, and without its anticipation and earlier
work such as headers-first I probably would have been arguing for a
block size decrease last year. This improvement in the state of the
art for widely available production Bitcoin software sets a stage for
some capacity increases while still catching up on our decentralization
deficit. This shifts the bottlenecks off of CPU and more strongly onto
propagation latency and bandwidth.

Versionbits (BIP9) is approaching maturity and will allow the Bitcoin
network to have multiple in-flight soft-forks. Up until now we’ve had to
completely serialize soft-fork work, and also had no real way to handle
a soft-fork that was merged in core but rejected by the network. All
that is solved in BIP9, which should allow us to pick up the pace of
improvements in the network. It looks like versionbits will be ready
for use in the next soft-fork performed on the network.

The next thing is that, at Scaling Bitcoin Hong Kong, Pieter Wuille
presented on bringing Segregated Witness to Bitcoin. What is proposed
is a _soft-fork_ that increases Bitcoin's scalability and capacity by
reorganizing data in blocks to handle the signatures separately, and in
doing so takes them outside the scope of the current blocksize limit.

The particular proposal amounts to a 4MB blocksize increase at worst. The
separation allows new security models, such as skipping downloading data
you're not going to check and improved performance for lite clients
(especially ones with high privacy). The proposal also includes fraud
proofs which make violations of the Bitcoin system provable with a compact
proof. This completes the vision of "alerts" described in the "Simplified
Payment Verification" section of the Bitcoin whitepaper, and would make it
possible for lite clients to enforce all the rules of the system (under
a new strong assumption that they're not partitioned from someone who
would generate the proofs). The design has numerous other features like
making further enhancements safer and eliminating signature malleability
problems. If widely used this proposal gives a 2x capacity increase
(more if multisig is widely used), but most importantly it makes that
additional capacity--and future capacity beyond it--safer by increasing
efficiency and allowing more trade-offs (in particular, you can use much
less bandwidth in exchange for a strong non-partitioning assumption).

There is a working implementation (though it doesn't yet have the fraud
proofs) at https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin/commits/segwit

(Pieter's talk is at: transcript:
http://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/scalingbitcoin/hong-kong/segregated-witness-and-its-impact-on-scalability/
slides:
https://prezi.com/lyghixkrguao/segregated-witness-and-deploying-it-for-bitcoin/
Video:
)

I had good success deploying an earlier (hard-fork) version of segwit
in the Elements Alpha sidechain; the soft-fork segwit now proposed
is a second-generation design. And I think it's quite reasonable to
get this deployed in a relatively short time frame. The segwit design
calls for a future bitcoinj compatible hardfork to further increase its
efficiency--but it's not necessary to reap most of the benefits,and that
means it can happen on its own schedule and in a non-contentious manner.

Going beyond segwit, there has been some considerable activity brewing
around more efficient block relay. There is a collection of proposals,
some stemming from a p2pool-inspired informal sketch of mine and some
independently invented, called "weak blocks", "thin blocks" or "soft
blocks". These proposals build on top of efficient relay techniques
(like the relay network protocol or IBLT) and move virtually all the
transmission time of a block to before the block is found, eliminating
size from the orphan race calculation. We already desperately need this
at the current block sizes. These have not yet been implemented, but
fortunately the path appears clear. I've seen at least one more or less
complete specification, and I expect to see things running using this in a
few months. This tool will remove propagation latency from being a problem
in the absence of strategic behavior by miners. Better understanding
their behavior when miners behave strategically is an open question.

Concurrently, there is a lot of activity ongoing related to
“non-bandwidth” scaling mechanisms. Non-bandwidth scaling mechanisms
are tools like transaction cut-through and bidirectional payment channels
which increase Bitcoin’s capacity and speed using clever smart contracts
rather than increased bandwidth. Critically, these approaches strike right
at the heart of the capacity vs autotomy trade-off, and may allow us to
achieve very high capacity and very high decentralization. CLTV (BIP65),
deployed a month ago and now active on the network, is very useful for
these techniques (essential for making hold-up refunds work); CSV (BIP68
/ BIP112) is in the pipeline for merge in core and making good progress
(and will likely be ready ahead of segwit). Further Bitcoin protocol
improvements for non-bandwidth scaling are in the works: Many of these
proposals really want anti-malleability fixes (which would be provided
by segwit), and there are checksig flag improvements already tendered and
more being worked on, which would be much easier to deploy with segwit. I
expect that within six months we could have considerably more features
ready for deployment to enable these techniques. Even without them I
believe we’ll be in an acceptable position with respect to capacity
in the near term, but it’s important to enable them for the future.

(http://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/scalingbitcoin/hong-kong/overview-of-bips-necessary-for-lightning
is a relevant talk for some of the wanted network features for Lightning,
a bidirectional payment channel proposal which many parties are working
on right now; other non-bandwidth improvements discussed in the past
include transaction cut-through, which I consider a must-read for the
basic intuition about how transaction capacity can be greater than
blockchain capacity: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=281848.0 ,
though there are many others.)

Further out, there are several proposals related to flex caps or
incentive-aligned dynamic block size controls based on allowing miners
to produce larger blocks at some cost. These proposals help preserve
the alignment of incentives between miners and general node operators,
and prevent defection between the miners from undermining the fee
market behavior that will eventually fund security. I think that right
now capacity is high enough and the needed capacity is low enough that
we don't immediately need these proposals, but they will be critically
important long term. I'm planning to help out and drive towards a more
concrete direction out of these proposals in the following months.

(Relevant talks include
http://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/scalingbitcoin/hong-kong/a-flexible-limit-trading-subsidy-for-larger-blocks/
)

Finally--at some point the capacity increases from the above may not
be enough. Delivery on relay improvements, segwit fraud proofs, dynamic
block size controls, and other advances in technology will reduce the risk
and therefore controversy around moderate block size increase proposals
(such as 2/4/8 rescaled to respect segwit's increase). Bitcoin will
be able to move forward with these increases when improvements and
understanding render their risks widely acceptable relative to the
risks of not deploying them. In Bitcoin Core we should keep patches
ready to implement them as the need and the will arises, to keep the
basic software engineering from being the limiting factor.

Our recent and current progress has well positioned the Bitcoin ecosystem
to handle its current capacity needs. I think the above sets out some
clear achievable milestones to continue to advance the art in Bitcoin
capacity while putting us in a good position for further improvement and
evolution.

TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk. BIP9
and segwit will also make further improvements easier and faster to
deploy. We’ll continue to set the stage for non-bandwidth-increase-based
scaling, while building additional tools that would make bandwidth
increases safer long term. Further work will prepare Bitcoin for further
increases, which will become possible when justified, while also providing
the groundwork to make them justifiable.

Thanks for your time,
Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-07 22:54:07 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
The Scaling Bitcoin Workshop in HK is just wrapping up. Many fascinating
proposals were presented. I think this would be a good time to share my
view of the near term arc for capacity increases in the Bitcoin system. I
believe we’re in a fantastic place right now and that the community
is ready to deliver on a clear forward path with a shared vision that
addresses the needs of the system while upholding its values.
ACK.

One of the interesting take-aways from the workshops for me has been
that there is a large discrepancy between what developers are doing
and what's more widely known. When I was doing initial research and
work for my keynote at the Montreal conference (
http://diyhpl.us/~bryan/irc/bitcoin/scalingbitcoin-review.pdf -- an
attempt at being exhaustive, prior to seeing the workshop proposals ),
what I was most surprised by was the discrepancy between what we think
is being talked about versus what has been emphasized or socially
processed (lots of proposals appear in text, but review efforts are
sometimes "hidden" in corners of github pull request comments, for
example). As another example, the libsecp256k1 testing work reached a
level unseen except perhaps in the aerospace industry, but these sorts
of details are not apparent if you are reading bitcoin-dev archives.
It is very hard to listen to all ideas and find great ideas.
Sometimes, our time can be almost completely exhausted by evaluating
inefficient proposals, so it's not surprising that rough consensus
building could take time. I suspect we will see consensus moving in
positive directions around the proposals you have highlighted.

When Satoshi originally released the Bitcoin whitepaper, practically
everyone-- somehow with the exception of Hal Finney-- didn't look,
because the costs of evaluating cryptographic system proposals is so
high and everyone was jaded and burned out for the past umpteen
decades. (I have IRC logs from January 10th 2009 where I immediately
dismissed Bitcoin after I had seen its announcement on the
p2pfoundation mailing list, perhaps in retrospect I should not let
family tragedy so greatly impact my evaluation of proposals...). It's
hard to evaluate these proposals. Sometimes it may feel like random
proposals are review-resistant, or designed to burn our time up. But I
think this is more reflective of the simple fact that consensus takes
effort, and it's hard work, and this is to be expected in this sort of
system design.

Your email contains a good summary of recent scaling progress and of
efforts presented at the Hong Kong workshop. I like summaries. I have
previously recommended making more summaries and posting them to the
mailing list. In general, it would be good if developers were to write
summaries of recent work and efforts and post them to the bitcoin-dev
mailing list. BIP drafts are excellent. Long-term proposals are
excellent. Short-term coordination happens over IRC, and that makes
sense to me. But I would point out that many of the developments even
from, say, the Montreal workshop were notably absent from the mailing
list. Unless someone was paying close attention, they wouldn't have
noticed some of those efforts which, in some cases, haven't been
mentioned since. I suspect most of this is a matter of attention,
review and keeping track of loose ends, which can be admittedly
difficult.

Short (or even long) summaries in emails are helpful because they
increase the ability of the community to coordinate and figure out
what's going on. Often I will write an email that summarizes some
content simply because I estimate that I am going to forget the
details in the near future, and if I am going to forget them then it
seems likely that others might.... This creates a broad base of
proposals and content to build from when we're doing development work
in the future, making for a much richer community as a consequence.
The contributions from the scalingbitcoin.org workshops are a welcome
addition, and the proposal outlined in the above email contains a good
summary of recent progress. We need more of this sort of synthesis,
we're richer for it. I am excitedly looking forward to the impending
onslaught of Bitcoin progress.

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 02:42:24 UTC
Permalink
... bringing Segregated Witness to Bitcoin.
The particular proposal amounts to a 4MB blocksize increase at worst.
Bit ambiguous what "worst" means here; lots of people would say the
smallest increase is the worst option. :)

By my count, P2PKH transactions get 2x space saving with segwit [0],
while 2-of-2 multisig P2SH transactions (and hence most of the on-chain
lightning transactions) get a 3x space saving [1]. An on-chain HTLC (for
a cross-chain atomic swap eg) would also get 3x space saving [2]. The most
extreme lightning transactions (uncooperative close with bonus anonymity)
could get a 6x saving, but would probably run into SIGOP limits [3].
If widely used this proposal gives a 2x capacity increase
(more if multisig is widely used),
So I think it's fair to say that on its own it gives up to a 2x increase
for ordinary pay to public key transactions, and a 3x increase for 2/2
multisig and (on-chain) lightning transactions (which would mean lightning
could scale to ~20M users with 1MB block sizes based on the estimates
from Tadge Dryja's talk). More complicated smart contracts (even just 3
of 5 multisig) presumably benefit even more from this, which seems like
an interesting approach to (part of) jgarzik's "Fidelity problem".

Averaging those numbers as a 2.5x improvement, means that combining
segwit with other proposals would allow you to derate them by a factor
of 2.5, giving:

BIP-100: maximum of 12.8MB
BIP-101: 3.2MB in 2016, 6.4MB in 2018, 12.8MB in 2020, 25.6MB in 2022..
2-4-8: 800kB in 2016, 1.6MB in 2018, 3.2MB in 2020
BIP-103: 400kB in 2016, 470kB in 2018, 650kB in 2020, 1MB in 2023...

(ie, if BIP-103 had been the "perfect" approach, then post segwit,
it would make sense to put non-consensus soft-limits back in place
for quite a while)
TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk.
I guess segwit effectively introduces two additional dimensions for
working out how to optimally pack transactions into a block -- there's
the existing constraints on block bytes (<=1MB) and sigops (<=20k), but
there are problably additional constraints on witness bytes (<=3MB) and
there *could* be a different constraint for sigops in witnesses (<=3*20k?
<=4*20k?) compared to sigops in the block while remaining a soft-fork.

It could also be an opportunity to combine the constraints, ie
(segwit_bytes + 50*segwit_sigs < 6M) which would make it easier to avoid
attacks where people try sending transactions with lots of sigops in very
few bytes, filling up blocks by sigops, but only paying fees proportional
to their byte count.

Hmm, after a quick look, I'm not sure if the current segwit branch
actually accounts for sigops in segregated witnesses? If it does, afaics
it simply applies the existing 20k limit to the total, which seems
too low to me?

Having segwit with the current 1MB limit on the traditional block
contents plus an additional 3MB for witness data seems like it would
also give a somewhat gradual increase in transaction volume from the
current 1x rate to an eventual 2x or 3x rate as wallet software upgrades
to support segregated witness transactions. So if problems were found
when block+witness data hit 1.5MB, there'd still be time to roll out
fixes before it got to 1.8MB or 2MB or 3MB. ie this further reduces the
risk compared to a single step increase to 2x capacity.

BTW, it's never been quite clear to me what the risks are precisely.
Here are some:

- sometime soon, blockchain supply can't meet demand

+ I've never worked out how you'd tell if this is the case;
there's potentially infinite demand if everything free, so at
one level it's trivially true, but that's not helpful.

+ Presumably if this were happening in a way that "matters", fees
would rise precipitously. Perhaps median fees of $2 USD/kB would
indicate this is happening? If so, it's not here yet and seems
like it's still a ways off.

+ If it were happening, then, presumably, people become would be
less optimistic about bitcoin and the price of BTC would drop/not
rise, but that seems pretty hard to interpret.

- it becomes harder to build on blocks found by other miners,
encouraging mining centralisation (which then makes censorship easier,
and fungibility harder) or forcing trust between miners (eg SPV mining
empty blocks)

+ latency/bandwidth limitations means miners can't get block
information quickly enough (mitigated by weak blocks and IBLT)

+ blocks can't be verified quickly enough (due to too many crypto
ops per block, or because the UTXO set can't be kept in RAM)
(mitigated by libsecp256k1 improvements, ..?)

+ constructing a new block to mine takes too long

- it becomes harder to maintain a validating, but non-mining node,
which in turn makes non-validating nodes harder to run safely (ie,
Sybil attacks become easier)

+ increased CPU to verify bigger/more complicated blocks (can't keep
up on a raspberry pi)

+ increased storage (60GB of blockchain might mean it won't fit on
your laptop)

+ increased bandwidth

+ increased initial sync time (delayed reward = less likely to
bother)

Cheers,
aj

[0] AIUI, segwit would make the "in block" transactions look like:

* (4) version
* (1) input count
* for each input:
- (32) tx hash
- (4) txout index
- (1) script length = 0
- (4) sequence number
* (1) output count
* for each output:
- (8) value
- (1) script length = 34
- (34) <33 byte push>
* (4) locktime

So about 10+41i+43o bytes (with the other information being external to
the block and the 1MB limit, but committed to via the coinbase).

A standard pay to public key hash would have a 25 byte output script
instead of 34 bytes, but also a 105 bytes of input script, so about
10+146i+34o bytes.

Over enough transactions inputs and outputs are about equal, so that's
10+84o versus 10+180o, so a factor of 2x-2.14x in the usual case.

[1] With a P2SH to a 2-of-2 multisig address, the output script would
be 23 bytes, and the input script would be a 71B redeem script, plus
two signatures and an OP_0 for about 215B, so totalling 10+256i+32o.

Again treating i=o over the long term, that's 10+84o version 10+288o,
so that's a 3.2x-3.4x improvement. 2-of-2 multisig payment would
cover the normal case for on-chain lightning channel transactions,
ie where both sides are able to cooperatively close the channel.

[2] A basic HTLC, ie: "pay to A if they know the preimage for X, or pay
to B after a timeout of T", done by P2SH has about 98B of redeem script
and either ~105B of signature or ~72B of signature for a total of 203B
or 170B of input script. So that comes to 10+244i+32o or 10+211i+32o.
Segwit gives an improvement of 3x-3.3x or 2.7x-2.9x there.

[3] A lightning-style HTLC, which adds a third option of ", or pay to
B if A was trying to cheat" adds an extra 25 bytes or so to the
redeem script, changing those numbers to 10+270i+32o and 10+236i+32o,
and an improvement of 3.3x-3.6x or 2.9x-3.2x.

A lightning-style HTLC that also uses ecc private keys as the secret
preimages to be revealed [4] might use an additional ~260 bytes of
redeem script / script signature, which would make the worst case
numbers be 10+530i+32o, so 10+562o versus 10+84o, which would be a
6x-6.7x improvement. But those particular scripts would be constrained
by consensus sigop limits before the filled up much more than a quarter
of a block in a segwit/1MB world anyway.

[4] http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-November/000344.html
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 04:58:03 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
If widely used this proposal gives a 2x capacity increase
(more if multisig is widely used),
So from IRC, this doesn't seem quite right -- capacity is constrained as

base_size + witness_size/4 <= 1MB

rather than

base_size <= 1MB and base_size + witness_size <= 4MB

or similar. So if you have a 500B transaction and move 250B into the
witness, you're still using up 250B+250B/4 of the 1MB limit, rather than
just 250B of the 1MB limit.

In particular, if you use as many p2pkh transactions as possible, you'd
have 800kB of base data plus 800kB of witness data, and for a block
filled with 2-of-2 multisig p2sh transactions, you'd hit the limit at
670kB of base data and 1.33MB of witness data.

That would be 1.6MB and 2MB of total actual data if you hit the limits
with real transactions, so it's more like a 1.8x increase for real
transactions afaics, even with substantial use of multisig addresses.

The 4MB consensus limit could only be hit by having a single trivial
transaction using as little base data as possible, then a single huge
4MB witness. So people trying to abuse the system have 4x the blocksize
for 1 block's worth of fees, while people using it as intended only get
1.6x or 2x the blocksize... That seems kinda backwards.

Having a cost function rather than separate limits does make it easier to
build blocks (approximately) optimally, though (ie, just divide the fee by
(base_bytes+witness_bytes/4) and sort). Are there any other benefits?

But afaics, you could just have fixed consensus limits and use the cost
function for building blocks, though? ie sort txs by fee divided by [B +
S*50 + W/3] (where B is base bytes, S is sigops and W is witness bytes)
then just fill up the block until one of the three limits (1MB base,
20k sigops, 3MB witness) is hit?

(Doing a hard fork to make *all* the limits -- base data, witness data,
and sigop count -- part of a single cost function might be a win; I'm
just not seeing the gain in forcing witness data to trade off against
block data when filling blocks is already a 2D knapsack problem)

Cheers,
aj
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 05:21:18 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 4:58 AM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
Having a cost function rather than separate limits does make it easier to
build blocks (approximately) optimally, though (ie, just divide the fee by
(base_bytes+witness_bytes/4) and sort). Are there any other benefits?
Actually being able to compute fees for your transaction: If there are
multiple limits that are "at play" then how you need to pay would
depend on the entire set of other candidate transactions, which is
unknown to you. Avoiding the need for a fancy solver in the miner is
also virtuous, because requiring software complexity there can make
for centralization advantages or divert development/maintenance cycles
in open source software off to other ends... The multidimensional
optimization is harder to accommodate for improved relay schemes, this
is the same as the "build blocks" but much more critical both because
of the need for consistency and the frequency in which you do it.

These don't, however, apply all that strongly if only one limit is
likely to be the limiting limit... though I am unsure about counting
on that; after all if the other limits wouldn't be limiting, why have
them?
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
That seems kinda backwards.
It can seem that way, but all limiting schemes have pathological cases
where someone runs up against the limit in the most costly way. Keep
in mind that casual pathological behavior can be suppressed via
IsStandard like rules without baking them into consensus; so long as
the candidate attacker isn't miners themselves. Doing so where
possible can help avoid cases like the current sigops limiting which
is just ... pretty broken.
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 06:54:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 4:58 AM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
Having a cost function rather than separate limits does make it easier to
build blocks (approximately) optimally, though (ie, just divide the fee by
(base_bytes+witness_bytes/4) and sort). Are there any other benefits?
Actually being able to compute fees for your transaction: If there are
multiple limits that are "at play" then how you need to pay would
depend on the entire set of other candidate transactions, which is
unknown to you.
Isn't that solvable in the short term, if miners just agree to order
transactions via a cost function, without enforcing it at consensus
level until a later hard fork that can also change the existing limits
to enforce that balance?

(1MB base + 3MB witness + 20k sigops) with segwit initially, to something
like (B + W + 200*U + 40*S < 5e6) where B is base bytes, W is witness
bytes, U is number of UTXOs added (or removed) and S is number of sigops,
or whatever factors actually make sense.

I guess segwit does allow soft-forking more sigops immediately -- segwit
transactions only add sigops into the segregated witness, which doesn't
get counted for existing consensus. So it would be possible to take the
opposite approach, and make the rule immediately be something like:

50*S < 1M
B + W/4 + 25*S' < 1M

(where S is sigops in base data, and S' is sigops in witness) and
just rely on S trending to zero (or soft-fork in a requirement that
non-segregated witness transactions have fewer than B/50 sigops) so that
there's only one (linear) equation to optimise, when deciding fees or
creating a block. (I don't see how you could safely set the coefficient
for S' too much smaller though)

B+W/4+25*S' for a 2-in/2-out p2pkh would still be 178+206/4+25*2=280
though, which would allow 3570 transactions per block, versus 2700 now,
which would only be a 32% increase...
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
These don't, however, apply all that strongly if only one limit is
likely to be the limiting limit... though I am unsure about counting
on that; after all if the other limits wouldn't be limiting, why have
them?
Sure, but, at least for now, there's already two limits that are being
hit. Having one is *much* better than two, but I don't think two is a
lot better than three?

(Also, the ratio between the parameters doesn't necessary seem like a
constant; it's not clear to me that hardcoding a formula with a single
limit is actually better than hardcoding separate limits, and letting
miners/the market work out coefficients that match the sort of contracts
that are actually being used)
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
That seems kinda backwards.
It can seem that way, but all limiting schemes have pathological cases
where someone runs up against the limit in the most costly way. Keep
in mind that casual pathological behavior can be suppressed via
IsStandard like rules without baking them into consensus; so long as
the candidate attacker isn't miners themselves. Doing so where
possible can help avoid cases like the current sigops limiting which
is just ... pretty broken.
Sure; it just seems to be halving the increase in block space (60% versus
100% extra for p2pkh, 100% versus 200% for 2/2 multisig p2sh) for what
doesn't actually look like that much of a benefit in fee comparisons?

I mean, as far as I'm concerned, segwit is great even if it doesn't buy
any improvement in transactions/block, so even a 1% gain is brilliant.
I'd just rather the 100%-200% gain I was expecting. :)

Cheers,
aj
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2016-01-18 12:02:51 UTC
Permalink
TLDR:

1.7MB effective block size is a better estimate than 1.6MB for p2pkh
with segwit. 2MB for 2/2 multisig still seems accurate.

Additional post-segwit soft forked script improvements can improve
the effective block size for p2pkh txns from 1.7MB to 1.9MB, and for
2/2 multisig from 2MB to 2.5MB/3MB.

(To the best of my knowledge, anyway; if I've made a mistake in my
maths or assumptions, corrections appreciated)
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
So from IRC, this doesn't seem quite right -- capacity is constrained as
base_size + witness_size/4 <= 1MB
..
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
That would be 1.6MB and 2MB of total actual data if you hit the limits
with real transactions, so it's more like a 1.8x increase for real
transactions afaics, even with substantial use of multisig addresses.
I think these numbers are slightly mistaken -- I was only aware of version
1 segwit scripts at the time, and assumed 256 bit hashes would be used
for all segwit transaction, however version 0 segwit txns would be more
efficient for p2pkh, with the same security as bitcoin currently has
(which seems fine).

Also, segwit will make two additional soft-fork improvements possible that
would have a positive effect on transactions per block without requiring
more data per block: ecdsa public key recovery (more space efficient for
*both* multisig and p2pkh) and schnorr signatures (more space efficient
multisig) which might also improve things. I don't know how soon they're
planned to be worked on post segwit's roll out; basic Schnorr signatures
are in the Elements sidechain, but I don't think key recovery has been
implemented anywhere? (Actually, I guess they could both be done already
via softforking OP_NOP opcodes, though segwit makes them slightly
cleaner)

Anyhoo here's some revised figures, working explained in the footnotes.
If I've made mistakes, corrections appreciated, of course.

p2pkh:

now: 10+146i+34o [0]
segwit: 10+41i+36o + 0.25*105*i [1]
ecdsa recovery: 10+41i+33o + 0.25*71*i [2]
80-bit schnorr: 10+41i+33o + 0.25*71*i (same as ecdsa recovery imo [3])
128-bit schnorr: 10+41i+43o + 0.25*106*i [4]

(128-bit schnorr provides a not very useful increase in security here)

2-of-2 multisig:

now: 10+254i+32o [5]
segwit: 10+43i+43o + 0.25*213*i [6]
ecdsa recovery: 10+43i+43o + 0.25+187*i [7]
80-bit schnorr: 10+41i+33o + 0.25*71*i (same as p2pkh)
128-bit schnorr: 10+41i+43o + 0.25*106*i (same as p2pkh)

(segwit, ecdsa recovery and 128-bit schnorr all provide a beneficial
security increase here, as per the "Time to worry about 80-bit collision
attacks" thread; 80-bit schnorr provides the same security as current
p2sh multisig)

Using the same assumptions in the previous mail, ie that over the long
term number inputs is about the same as number of outputs, these
simplify to:

p2pkh 2-of-2 msig
now 10+180i 10+286i
segwit 10+104i 10+140i
recov 10+92i 10+133i
sch80 10+92i 10+92i
sch128 10+111i 10+111i

Translating "now" to 100%, the scaling factors work out to be:

i=1, i->inf

p2pkh 2-of-2 msig
now 100% 100%
segwit 166%-173% 197%-204%
recov 186%-195% 207%-215%
sch80 186%-195% 290%-310%
sch128 157%-162% 244%-257%

So 170% for p2pkh (rather my original estimate of 160%) and 200% for
multisig (same as my original estimate), which can rise via further
soft-forks up to 190% for p2pkh and 250% or 300% for 2-of-2 multisig
(depending on whether you want additional security for 2/2 multisig
beyond what's currently available).

(I'm assuming people are mostly interested in the number of transactions
per block (or tx/second or tx/day); if miners are worried about the
actual data per block (which effects orphan rates) implied by the above,
but don't want to work it out themselves, I could do the maths for that
too pretty easily. Let me know)


If a 2MB hard fork is done first, then the 1/4 discount for segwit could
mean up to 8MB of total data per block -- from what I understand this
is currently infeasible; so I presume that segwit on top of a hardfork
and prior to IBLT/weak blocks would need to have a smaller discount or
no discount applied so as to ensure total data per block remains at 4MB
or less. With no discount for witness data (ie, no "accounting tricks")
those figures look like:

p2pkh 2-of-2 msig
now 100% 100%
segwit 99% 95%
recov 122%-124% 104%
sch80 122%-124% 191%-198%
sch128 94%-95% 148%-150%

That is, without discounting, segwit comes at a slight cost in
transactions per block, and additional soft forks will only result in
25% gain for p2pkh (via key recovery) and 50%-100% for 2-of-2 multisig
(through the use of schnorr sigs and key recovery, and depending on
whether you want 128 bits of security rather than 80 bits).

(So without the discounting factor, with a 2MB block size, 2MB per block
with segwit and key recovery gives you 25% more p2pkh transactions than
just 2MB per block now; while segwit and schnorr signatures gives you
50%-100% more 2/2 multisig transactions in the same 2MB. Likewise with
1MB or 4MB and no discounting. Discounting has the indirect benefit of
providing a monetary incentive to limit UTXO sizes however)


(2 of 3 multisig for escrow payments would probably be interesting to
work out too; I think ecdsa key recovery combined with 1/4 discounting
would provide a substantial improvement there. I don't think Schnorr
helps at all for that case, unfortunately; and it's probably too small
scale for merkle-ised abstract syntax trees to do any good either)


A caveat: I'm only counting the script data from witnesses here; but it's
possible that additional metadata (such as a length for each witness
signature, or the value of the input, or even some/all of the merkle
hashes) should also be accounted for. I don't think any of them need to
be accounted for segwit as proposed, but I'm not sure. And it might well
be different for a hardforked segwit; there I have no idea at all. I
don't think a byte or two for length would make much difference, at least.

Cheers,
aj

[0] 10 bytes for version (4), input count (1), output count (1) and
locktime (4); 146 bytes per input consisting of tx hash (32), txout
index (4), script length (1), scriptsig (signature and pubkey =
105), CHECKSIG = 25), and sequence number (4); 34 bytes per output
consisting of value (8), script length (1) and scriptpubkey (DUP
HASH160 PUSH20 EQVERIFY CHECKSIG = 25).

[1] Same as now, except two extra bytes per output script (segwit push and
segwit version byte), and moving the 105 bytes of signature script
directly into the segregated witness

[2] Allowing ECDSA recovery requires an additional soft-fork post segwit
to change the CHECKSIG operation; this requires bumping the
segwit script version to 2 or higher and possibly using a different
opcode, but allows the scriptsig to just be the 70 byte signature,
without also including the 33 byte pubkey. The 33 byte pubkey is
automatically calculated from the signature, and verified against
the hash provided in the scriptpubkey to maintain security, with a
scriptpubkey like: [PUSH (20 byte pubkey hash) CHECKSIG_RECOVER] (22
bytes versus 25 bytes), and a scriptsig like [PUSH (70 byte sig)]
(71 bytes versus 105 bytes).

[3] libsecp256k1 has a function to recover a pubkey from a schnorr
signature, so I'm assuming that means pubkey recovery with schnorr
is possible :) -- I haven't actually verified the maths
https://github.com/bitcoin/secp256k1/blob/master/include/secp256k1_schnorr.h

[4] The witness scriptpubkey is limited to 32 bytes (plus push op and
version byte for a total of 34 bytes, so 128 bit security requires
version 1 segwit, and p2sh-style constuction. Hence: 10 bytes
(version, input and output counts and locktime); 41 base bytes per
input (tx hash, tx index, script length, and sequence number); 106
witness bytes per input (sig (70 bytes) plus witness script (PUSH
schnorr merged pubkey (32 bytes) plus CHECKSCHNORR), plus PUSH ops);
and 43 bytes per output (value, script length, and 34 bytes for the
v1-style witness script).

[5] Per input is (32 bytes tx hash, 4 bytes tx index, 4 bytes nsequence,
1 byte scriptsig length, 143 bytes for actual signature (2x70
for the sigs, 3 bytes for OP_0 and two OP_PUSH), and 70 bytes for
the redeemscript (2 pub pub 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG)) for 254 bytes;
per output is (8 bytes value, 1 byte length, 23 bytes for HASH160
[20 byte hash] OP_EQUAL) for 32 bytes.

[6] Per input is (34 bytes tx hash, 4 bytes tx index, 4 bytes nsequence,
1 byte scriptsig length) for 43 bytes in the base block and (143
bytes for the actual signature, plus 70 bytes for the redeemscript)
for 213 bytes of witness data; per output is (8 bytes value, 1 byte
length, and 34 bytes for version 1 segwit scriptpubkey) for 43
bytes.

[7] Same as [6], but with key recovery on a MULTISIG op, rather than 33
bytes per pubkey, this could be reduced to a 20 byte pubkey hash
per pubkey, for a saving of 26 bytes of witness data.
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2016-01-22 09:46:18 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
I think these numbers are slightly mistaken -- I was only aware of version
1 segwit scripts at the time, and assumed 256 bit hashes would be used
for all segwit transaction, however version 0 segwit txns would be more
efficient for p2pkh, with the same security as bitcoin currently has
(which seems fine).
Latest segwit code just has version 0 witness format, and treats a 32
byte push as the sha256 of a script, and a 20 byte push as the hash of
the pub key. Also, the witness scriptPubKey format uses "OP_0 [hash]" to
push the version and hash to the script separately, rather than "[0x00
script]" or "[0x01 hash]" (this changes allows segwit transactions to
be encoded backwards compatibly as a p2sh payment).
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
segwit: 10+41i+36o + 0.25*105*i [1]
[0] 10 bytes for version (4), input count (1), output count (1) and
locktime (4); 146 bytes per input consisting of tx hash (32), txout
index (4), script length (1), scriptsig (signature and pubkey =
105), CHECKSIG = 25), and sequence number (4); 34 bytes per output
consisting of value (8), script length (1) and scriptpubkey (DUP
HASH160 PUSH20 EQVERIFY CHECKSIG = 25).
[1] Same as [0], except two extra bytes per output script (segwit push
and segwit version byte), and moving the 105 bytes of signature
script directly into the segregated witness
So this change means segwit p2pkh needs 31 bytes per output not 36 bytes (value,
length stay the same, scriptpubkey becomes "OP_0 PUSH20" for 22 bytes
instead of 25+2 bytes). This gives another couple of percent gain, so:

segwit: 10+41i+31o + 0.25*105*i [1]
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
p2pkh 2-of-2 msig
now 10+180i 10+286i
segwit 10+104i 10+140i
become:

segwit 10+99i 10+140i

and therefore,
Post by Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
p2pkh 2-of-2 msig
now 100% 100%
segwit 166%-173% 197%-204%
becomes:

segwit 174%-181% 197%-204%

Constantly creeping up! Pretty nice.

Also, p2pkh with segwit-via-p2sh is probably interesting, those numbers
work out as:

segwit: 10+41i+31o + 0.25*105*i (for comparison)
segp2sh: 10+60i+32o + 0.25*105*i [0]
-> 10+119i
-> 147%-151%

So that still looks like a reasonable improvement even if (eg) in the
short term merchants are the only ones that upgrade, and customers just
use non-segwit-aware wallets with a p2sh address that's only redeemable
by a segwit-aware wallet.

Cheers,
aj

[0] 10 bytes standard. For each input, tx hash (32) plus index (4),
script length (1) and scriptsig which is a push of the standard segwit
pubscript (22+1) totaling to 60, and witness data is the same as for
normal segwit (105). Each output is standard p2sh, which is value
(8), length (1) and script (23) for a total of 32.

Cheers,
aj

Wladimir J. van der Laan via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 11:07:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
The Scaling Bitcoin Workshop in HK is just wrapping up. Many fascinating
proposals were presented. I think this would be a good time to share my
view of the near term arc for capacity increases in the Bitcoin system. I
believe we’re in a fantastic place right now and that the community
is ready to deliver on a clear forward path with a shared vision that
addresses the needs of the system while upholding its values.
Thanks for writing this up. Putting the progress, ongoing work and plans related
to scaling in context, in one place, was badly needed.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk. BIP9
and segwit will also make further improvements easier and faster to
deploy. We’ll continue to set the stage for non-bandwidth-increase-based
scaling, while building additional tools that would make bandwidth
increases safer long term. Further work will prepare Bitcoin for further
increases, which will become possible when justified, while also providing
the groundwork to make them justifiable.
Sounds good to me.

There are multiple ways to get involved in ongoing work, where the community
can help to make this happen sooner:

- Review the versionbits BIP https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki:

- Compare and test with implementation: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6816

- Review CSV BIPs (BIP68 https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0068.mediawiki /
BIP112 https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0112.mediawiki),

- Compare and test implementation:

https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6564 BIP-112: Mempool-only CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6312 BIP-68: Mempool-only sequence number constraint verification
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/7184 [WIP] Implement SequenceLocks functions for BIP 68

- Segwit BIP is being written, but has not yet been published.

- Gregory linked to an implementation but as he mentions it is not completely
finished yet. ETA for a Segwit testnet is later this month, then you can test as well.

Wladimir
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 11:14:32 UTC
Permalink
On Dec 8, 2015 7:08 PM, "Wladimir J. van der Laan via bitcoin-dev" <
Post by Wladimir J. van der Laan via bitcoin-dev
- Gregory linked to an implementation but as he mentions it is not completely
finished yet. ETA for a Segwit testnet is later this month, then you can test as well.
Testnet4 ?
Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 15:12:10 UTC
Permalink
Thanks for laying out a road-map, Greg.

I'll need to think about it some more, but just a couple of initial
reactions:

Why segwitness as a soft fork? Stuffing the segwitness merkle tree in the
coinbase is messy and will just complicate consensus-critical code (as
opposed to making the right side of the merkle tree in block.version=5
blocks the segwitness data).

It will also make any segwitness fraud proofs significantly larger (merkle
path versus merkle path to coinbase transactions, plus ENTIRE coinbase
transaction, which might be quite large, plus merkle path up to root).


We also need to fix the O(n^2) sighash problem as an additional BIP for ANY
blocksize increase. That also argues for a hard fork-- it is much easier to
fix it correctly and simplify the consensus code than to continue to apply
band-aid fixes on top of something fundamentally broken.


Segwitness will require a hard or soft-fork rollout, then a significant
fraction of the transaction-producing wallets to upgrade and start
supporting segwitness-style transactions. I think it will be much quicker
than the P2SH rollout, because the biggest transaction producers have a
strong motivation to lower their fees, and it won't require a new type of
bitcoin address to fund wallets. But it still feels like it'll be six
months to a year at the earliest before any relief from the current
problems we're seeing from blocks filling up.

Segwitness will make the current bottleneck (block propagation) a little
worse in the short term, because of the extra fraud-proof data. Benefits
well worth the costs.

------------------

I think a barrier to quickly getting consensus might be a fundamental
difference of opinion on this:
"Even without them I believe we’ll be in an acceptable position with
respect to capacity in the near term"

The heaviest users of the Bitcoin network (businesses who generate tens of
thousands of transactions per day on behalf of their customers) would
strongly disgree; the current state of affairs is NOT acceptable to them.
--
--
Gavin Andresen
Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 15:55:57 UTC
Permalink
Stuffing the segwitness merkle tree in the coinbase
If such a change is going to be deployed via a soft fork instead of a
hard fork, then the coinbase is the worst place to put the segwitness
merkle root.

Instead, put it in the first output of the generation transaction as an
OP_RETURN script.

This is a better pattern because coinbase space is limited while output
space is not. The next time there's a good reason to tie another merkle
tree to a block, that proposal can be designated for the second output
of the generation transaction.
Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 17:41:23 UTC
Permalink
A far better place than the generation transaction (which I assume means
coinbase transaction?) is the last transaction in the block. That allows
you to save, on average, half of the hashes in the Merkle tree.

On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 11:55 PM, Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
Stuffing the segwitness merkle tree in the coinbase
If such a change is going to be deployed via a soft fork instead of a
hard fork, then the coinbase is the worst place to put the segwitness
merkle root.
Instead, put it in the first output of the generation transaction as an
OP_RETURN script.
This is a better pattern because coinbase space is limited while output
space is not. The next time there's a good reason to tie another merkle
tree to a block, that proposal can be designated for the second output
of the generation transaction.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 18:43:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
A far better place than the generation transaction (which I assume means
coinbase transaction?) is the last transaction in the block. That allows
you to save, on average, half of the hashes in the Merkle tree.
I don't care what color that bikeshed is painted.

In whatever transaction it is placed, the hash should be on the output
side, That way is more future-proof since it does not crowd out other
hashes which might be equally valuable to commit someday.
Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 19:08:57 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 5:41 PM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
A far better place than the generation transaction (which I assume means
coinbase transaction?) is the last transaction in the block. That allows
you to save, on average, half of the hashes in the Merkle tree.
This trick can be improved by only using certain tx counts. If the number
of transactions is limited to a power of 2 (other than the extra
transactions), then you get a path of length zero.

The number of non-zero bits in the tx count determings how many digests are
required.

https://github.com/TierNolan/bips/blob/aux_header/bip-aux-header.mediawiki

This gets the benefit of a soft-fork, while also keeping the proof lengths
small. The linked bip has a 105 byte overhead for the path.

The cost is that only certain transaction counts are allowed. In the worst
case, 12.5% of transactions would have to be left in the memory pool. This
means around 7% of transactions would be delayed until the next block.

Blank transactions (or just transactions with low latency requirements)
could be used to increase the count so that it is raised to one of the
valid numbers.

Managing the UTXO set to ensure that there is at least one output that pays
to OP_TRUE is also a hassle.
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 19:31:27 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:55 PM, Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
Post by Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
Instead, put it in the first output of the generation transaction as an
OP_RETURN script.
Pieter was originally putting it in a different location; so it's no
big deal to do so.

But there exists deployed mining hardware that imposes constraints on
the coinbase outputs, unfortunately.
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 23:40:42 UTC
Permalink
Agree. This data does not belong in the coinbase. That space is for miners to use, not devs.

I also think that a hard fork is better for SegWit, as it reduces the size of fraud proofs considerably, makes the whole design more elegant and less kludgey, and is safer for clients who do not upgrade in a timely fashion. I don't like the idea that SegWit would invalidate the security assumptions of non-upgraded clients (including SPV wallets). I think that for these clients, no data is better than invalid data. Better to force them to upgrade by cutting them off the network than to let them think they're validating transactions when they're not.
Post by Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
If such a change is going to be deployed via a soft fork instead of a
hard fork, then the coinbase is the worst place to put the segwitness
merkle root.
Instead, put it in the first output of the generation transaction as an
OP_RETURN script.
This is a better pattern because coinbase space is limited while output
space is not. The next time there's a good reason to tie another merkle
tree to a block, that proposal can be designated for the second output
of the generation transaction.
Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 23:48:53 UTC
Permalink
On Tuesday, December 08, 2015 11:40:42 PM Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
Agree. This data does not belong in the coinbase. That space is for miners
to use, not devs.
This has never been guaranteed, nor are softforks a "dev action" in the first
place.
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
I also think that a hard fork is better for SegWit, as it reduces the size
of fraud proofs considerably, makes the whole design more elegant and less
kludgey, and is safer for clients who do not upgrade in a timely fashion.
How about we pursue the SegWit softfork, and at the same time* work on a
hardfork which will simplify the proofs and reduce the kludgeyness of merge-
mining in general? Then, if the hardfork is ready before the softfork, they
can both go together, but if not, we aren't stuck delaying the improvements of
SegWit until the hardfork is completed.

* I have been in fact working on such a proposal for a while now, since before
SegWit.
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
I don't like the idea that SegWit would invalidate the security
assumptions of non-upgraded clients (including SPV wallets). I think that
for these clients, no data is better than invalid data. Better to force
them to upgrade by cutting them off the network than to let them think
they're validating transactions when they're not.
There isn't an option for "no data", as non-upgraded nodes in a hardfork are
left completely vulnerable to attacking miners, even much lower hashrate than
the 51% attack risk. So the alternatives are:
- hardfork: complete loss of all security for the old nodes
- softfork: degraded security for old nodes

Luke
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 00:54:38 UTC
Permalink
Post by Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
How about we pursue the SegWit softfork, and at the same time* work on a
hardfork which will simplify the proofs and reduce the kludgeyness of merge-
mining in general? Then, if the hardfork is ready before the softfork, they
can both go together, but if not, we aren't stuck delaying the improvements of
SegWit until the hardfork is completed.
So that all our code that parses the blockchain needs to be able to find the sigwit data in both places? That doesn't really sound like an improvement to me. Why not just do it as a hard fork? They're really not that hard to do.
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 23:50:35 UTC
Permalink
On Dec 9, 2015 7:41 AM, "Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev" <
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
I also think that a hard fork is better for SegWit, as it reduces the
size of fraud proofs considerably, makes the whole design more elegant and
less kludgey, and is safer for clients who do not upgrade in a timely
fashion.

I agree, although I disagree with the last reason.
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
I don't like the idea that SegWit would invalidate the security
assumptions of non-upgraded clients (including SPV wallets). I think that
for these clients, no data is better than invalid data. Better to force
them to upgrade by cutting them off the network than to let them think
they're validating transactions when they're not.

I don't undesrtand. SPV nodes won't think they are validating transactions
with the new version unless they adapt to the new format. They will be
simply unable to receive payments using the new format if it is a softfork
(although as said I agree with making it a hardfork on the simpler design
and smaller fraud proofs grounds alone).
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
On Dec 8, 2015, at 11:55 PM, Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
If such a change is going to be deployed via a soft fork instead of a
hard fork, then the coinbase is the worst place to put the segwitness
merkle root.
Instead, put it in the first output of the generation transaction as an
OP_RETURN script.
This is a better pattern because coinbase space is limited while output
space is not. The next time there's a good reason to tie another merkle
tree to a block, that proposal can be designated for the second output
of the generation transaction.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 00:56:25 UTC
Permalink
I don't undesrtand. SPV nodes won't think they are validating transactions with the new version unless they adapt to the new format. They will be simply unable to receive payments using the new format if it is a softfork (although as said I agree with making it a hardfork on the simpler design and smaller fraud proofs grounds alone).
Okay, I might just not understand how a sigwit payment would look to current software yet. I'll add learning about that to my to-do list...
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 23:59:33 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:12 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Why segwitness as a soft fork? Stuffing the segwitness merkle tree in the
coinbase is messy and will just complicate consensus-critical code (as
opposed to making the right side of the merkle tree in block.version=5
blocks the segwitness data).
It's nearly complexity-costless to put it in the coinbase transaction.
Exploring the costs is one of the reasons why this was implemented
first.

We already have consensus critical enforcement there, the height,
which has almost never been problematic. (A popular block explorer
recently misimplemented the var-int decode and suffered an outage).

And most but not all prior commitment proposals have suggested the
same or similar. The exact location is not that critical, however,
and we do have several soft-fork compatible options.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
It will also make any segwitness fraud proofs significantly larger (merkle
path versus merkle path to coinbase transactions, plus ENTIRE coinbase
transaction, which might be quite large, plus merkle path up to root).
Yes, it will make them larger by log2() the number of transaction in a
block which is-- say-- 448 bytes.

With the coinbase transaction thats another couple kilobytes, I think
this is negligible.

From a risk reduction perspective, I think it is much preferable to
perform the primary change in a backwards compatible manner, and pick
up the data reorganization in a hardfork if anyone even cares.

I think thats generally a nice cadence to split up risks that way; and
avoid controversy.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
We also need to fix the O(n^2) sighash problem as an additional BIP for ANY
blocksize increase.
The witness data is never an input to sighash, so no, I don't agree
that this holds for "any" increase.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Segwitness will make the current bottleneck (block propagation) a little
worse in the short term, because of the extra fraud-proof data. Benefits
well worth the costs.
The fraud proof data is deterministic, full nodes could skip sending
it between each other, if anyone cared; but the overhead is pretty
tiny in any case.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
I think a barrier to quickly getting consensus might be a fundamental
"Even without them I believe we’ll be in an acceptable position with
respect to capacity in the near term"
The heaviest users of the Bitcoin network (businesses who generate tens of
thousands of transactions per day on behalf of their customers) would
strongly disgree; the current state of affairs is NOT acceptable to them.
My message lays out a plan for several different complementary
capacity advances; it's not referring to the current situation--
though the current capacity situation is no emergency.

I believe it already reflects the emerging consensus in the Bitcoin
Core project; in terms of the overall approach and philosophy, if not
every specific technical detail. It's not a forever plan, but a
pragmatic one that understand that the future is uncertain no matter
what we do; one that trusts that we'll respond to whatever
contingencies surprise us on the road to success.
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 00:58:06 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 12:59 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:12 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
We already have consensus critical enforcement there, the height,
which has almost never been problematic. (A popular block explorer
recently misimplemented the var-int decode and suffered an outage).
It would be also a nice opportunity to move the height to a more
accessible place.
For example CBlockHeader::hashMerkleRoot (and CBlockIndex's) could be
replaced with a hash of the following struct:

struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
int32_t nHeight;
}
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
From a risk reduction perspective, I think it is much preferable to
perform the primary change in a backwards compatible manner, and pick
up the data reorganization in a hardfork if anyone even cares.
But then all wallet software will need to adapt their software twice.
Why introduce technical debt for no good reason?
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I think thats generally a nice cadence to split up risks that way; and
avoid controversy.
Uncontroversial hardforks can also be deployed with small risks as
described in BIP99.
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 01:02:58 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
int32_t nHeight;
}
Or better, for forward compatibility (we may want to include more
things apart from nHeight and hashWitnessesRoot in the future):

struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
uint256 hashextendedHeader;
}

For example, we may want to chose to add an extra nonce there.
Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 01:09:16 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
We also need to fix the O(n^2) sighash problem as an additional BIP for
ANY
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
blocksize increase.
The witness data is never an input to sighash, so no, I don't agree
that this holds for "any" increase.
Here's the attack:

Create a 1-megabyte transaction, with all of it's inputs spending
segwitness-spending SIGHASH_ALL inputs.

Because the segwitness inputs are smaller in the block, you can fit more of
them into 1 megabyte. Each will hash very close to one megabyte of data.

That will be O(n^2) worse than the worst case of a 1-megabyte transaction
with signatures in the scriptSigs.

Did I misunderstand something or miss something about the 1-mb transaction
data and 3-mb segwitness data proposal that would make this attack not
possible?

RE: fraud proof data being deterministic: yes, I see, the data can be
computed instead of broadcast with the block.

RE: emerging consensus of Core:

I think it is a huge mistake not to "design for success" (see
http://gavinandresen.ninja/designing-for-success ).

I think it is a huge mistake to pile on technical debt in
consensus-critical code. I think we should be working harder to make things
simpler, not more complex, whenever possible.

And I think there are pretty big self-inflicted current problems because
worries about theoretical future problems have prevented us from coming to
consensus on simple solutions.
--
--
Gavin Andresen
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 01:31:51 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Create a 1-megabyte transaction, with all of it's inputs spending
segwitness-spending SIGHASH_ALL inputs.
Because the segwitness inputs are smaller in the block, you can fit more of
them into 1 megabyte. Each will hash very close to one megabyte of data.
Witness size comes out of the 1MB at a factor of 0.25. It is not
possible to make a block which has signatures with the full 1MB of
data under the sighash while also having signatures externally. So
every byte moved into the witness and thus only counted as 25% comes
out of the data being hashed and is hashed nInputs (*checksigs) less
times.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
I think it is a huge mistake not to "design for success" (see
http://gavinandresen.ninja/designing-for-success ).
We are designing for success; including the success of being able to
adapt and cope with uncertainty-- which is the most critical kind of
success we can have in a world where nothing is and can be
predictable.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
I think it is a huge mistake to pile on technical debt in consensus-critical
code. I think we should be working harder to make things simpler, not more
complex, whenever possible.
I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
And I think there are pretty big self-inflicted current problems because
worries about theoretical future problems have prevented us from coming to
consensus on simple solutions.
That isn't my perspective. I believe we've suffered delays because of
a strong desire to be inclusive and hear out all ideas, and not
forestall market adoption, even for ideas that eschewed pragmatism and
tried to build for forever in a single step and which in our hear of
hearts we knew were not the right path today. It's time to move past
that and get back on track with the progress can make and have been
making, in terms of capacity as well as many other areas. I think that
is designing for success.
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 04:51:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Create a 1-megabyte transaction, with all of it's inputs spending
segwitness-spending SIGHASH_ALL inputs.
Because the segwitness inputs are smaller in the block, you can fit more of
them into 1 megabyte. Each will hash very close to one megabyte of data.
Witness size comes out of the 1MB at a factor of 0.25. It is not
possible to make a block which has signatures with the full 1MB of
data under the sighash while also having signatures externally. So
every byte moved into the witness and thus only counted as 25% comes
out of the data being hashed and is hashed nInputs (*checksigs) less
times.
So the worst case script I can come up with is:

<pubkey> 1 0 {2OVER CHECKSIG ADD CODESEP} OP_EQUAL

which (if I didn't mess it up) would give you a redeem script of about
36B plus 4B per sigop, redeemable via a single signature that's valid
for precisely one of the checksigs.

Maxing out 20k sigops gives 80kB of redeemscript in that case; so you
could have to hash 19.9GB of data to fully verify the script with
current bitcoin rules.

Segwit with the 75% factor and the same sigop limit would make that very
slightly worse -- it'd up the hashed data by maybe 1MB in total. Without
a sigop limit at all it'd be severely worse of course -- you could fit
almost 500k sigops in 2MB of witness data, leaving 500kB of base data,
for a total of 250GB of data to hash to verify your 3MB block...

Segwit without the 75% factor, but with a 3MB of witness data limit,
makes that up to three times worse (750k sigops in 3MB of witness data,
with 1MB of base data for 750GB of data to hash), but with any reasonable
sigop limit, afaics it's pretty much the same.

However I think you could add some fairly straightforward (maybe
soft-forking) optimisations to just rule out that sort of (deliberate)
abuse; eg disallowing more than a dozen sigops per input, or just failing
checksigs with the same key in a single input, maybe. So maybe that's
not sufficiently realistic?

I think the only realistic transactions that would cause lots of sigs and
hashing are ones that have lots of inputs that each require a signature
or two, so might happen if a miner is cleaning up dust. In that case,
your 1MB transaction is a single output with a bunch of 41B inputs. If you
have 10k such inputs, that's only 410kB. If each input is a legitimate
2 of 2 multisig, that's about 210 bytes of witness data per input, or
2.1MB, leaving 475kB of base data free, which matches up. 20k sigops by
475kB of data is 9.5GB of hashing.

Switching from 2-of-2 multisig to just a single public key would prevent
you from hitting the sigop limit; I think you could hit 14900 signatures
with about 626kB of base data and 1488kB of witness data, for about
9.3GB of hashed data.

That's a factor of 2x improvement over the deliberately malicious exploit
case above, but it's /only/ a factor of 2x.

I think Rusty's calculation http://rusty.ozlabs.org/?p=522 was that
the worst case for now is hashing about 406kB, 3300 times for 1.34GB of
hashed data [0].

So that's still almost a factor of 4 or 5 worse than what's possible now?
Unless I messed up the maths somewhere?

Cheers,
aj

[0] Though I'm not sure that's correct? Seems like with a 1MB
transaction with i inputs, each with s bytes of scriptsig, that you're
hashing (1MB-s*i), and the scriptsig for a p2pkh should only be about
105B, not 180B. So maximising i*(1MB-s*i) = 1e6*i - 105*i^2 gives i =
1e6/210, so 4762 inputs, and hashing 500kB of data each time,
for about 2.4GB of hashed data total.
Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 04:44:09 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
I don't think I would classify placing things in consensus critical code
when it doesn't need to be as "structural tidying". Gavin said "pile on"
which you took as implying "a lot", he can correct me, but I believe he
meant "add to".
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
(especially ones with poorly understood system wide consequences and low
user autonomy)

This implies there you have no confidence in the unit tests and functional
testing around Bitcoin and should not be a reason to avoid refactoring.
It's more a reason to increase testing so that you will have confidence
when you refactor.

Also I don't think Martin Fowler would agree with you...

"Refactoring should be done in conjunction with adding new features."

"Always leave the code better than when you found it."

"Often you start working on adding new functionality and you realize the
existing structures don't play well with what you're about to do.

In this situation it usually pays to begin by refactoring the existing code
into the shape you now know is the right shape for what you're about to do."

-Martin Fowler








On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 7:31 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Create a 1-megabyte transaction, with all of it's inputs spending
segwitness-spending SIGHASH_ALL inputs.
Because the segwitness inputs are smaller in the block, you can fit more
of
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
them into 1 megabyte. Each will hash very close to one megabyte of data.
Witness size comes out of the 1MB at a factor of 0.25. It is not
possible to make a block which has signatures with the full 1MB of
data under the sighash while also having signatures externally. So
every byte moved into the witness and thus only counted as 25% comes
out of the data being hashed and is hashed nInputs (*checksigs) less
times.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
I think it is a huge mistake not to "design for success" (see
http://gavinandresen.ninja/designing-for-success ).
We are designing for success; including the success of being able to
adapt and cope with uncertainty-- which is the most critical kind of
success we can have in a world where nothing is and can be
predictable.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
I think it is a huge mistake to pile on technical debt in
consensus-critical
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
code. I think we should be working harder to make things simpler, not
more
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
complex, whenever possible.
I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
And I think there are pretty big self-inflicted current problems because
worries about theoretical future problems have prevented us from coming
to
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
consensus on simple solutions.
That isn't my perspective. I believe we've suffered delays because of
a strong desire to be inclusive and hear out all ideas, and not
forestall market adoption, even for ideas that eschewed pragmatism and
tried to build for forever in a single step and which in our hear of
hearts we knew were not the right path today. It's time to move past
that and get back on track with the progress can make and have been
making, in terms of capacity as well as many other areas. I think that
is designing for success.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 06:29:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
I don't think I would classify placing things in consensus critical code
when it doesn't need to be as "structural tidying". Gavin said "pile on"
which you took as implying "a lot", he can correct me, but I believe he
meant "add to".
Nothing being discussed would move something from consensus critical
code to not consensus critical.

What was being discussed was the location of the witness commitment;
which is consensus critical regardless of where it is placed. Should
it be placed in an available location which is compatible with the
existing network, or should the block hashing data structure
immediately be changed in an incompatible way to accommodate it in
order to satisfy an ascetic sense of purity and to make fraud proofs
somewhat smaller?

I argue that the size difference in the fraud proofs is not
interesting, the disruption to the network in an incompatible upgrade
is interesting; and that if it really were desirable reorganization to
move the commitment point could be done as part of a separate change
that changes only the location of things (and/or other trivial
adjustments); and that proceeding int this fashion would minimize
disruption and risk... by making the incompatible changes that will
force network wide software updates be as small and as simple as
possible.
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
(especially ones with poorly understood system wide consequences and low
user autonomy)
This implies there you have no confidence in the unit tests and functional
testing around Bitcoin and should not be a reason to avoid refactoring.
It's more a reason to increase testing so that you will have confidence when
you refactor.
I am speaking from our engineering experience in a public,
world-wide, multi-vendor, multi-version, inter-operable, distributed
system which is constantly changing and in production contains private
code, unknown and assorted hardware, mixtures of versions, unreliable
networks, undisclosed usage patterns, and more sources of complex
behavior than can be counted-- including complex economic incentives
and malicious participants.

Even if we knew the complete spectrum of possible states for the
system the combinatioric explosion makes complete testing infeasible.

Though testing is essential one cannot "unit test" away all the risks
related to deploying a new behavior in the network.
Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 06:36:22 UTC
Permalink
I see, thanks for clearing that up, I misread what Gavin stated.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
I don't think I would classify placing things in consensus critical code
when it doesn't need to be as "structural tidying". Gavin said "pile on"
which you took as implying "a lot", he can correct me, but I believe he
meant "add to".
Nothing being discussed would move something from consensus critical
code to not consensus critical.
What was being discussed was the location of the witness commitment;
which is consensus critical regardless of where it is placed. Should
it be placed in an available location which is compatible with the
existing network, or should the block hashing data structure
immediately be changed in an incompatible way to accommodate it in
order to satisfy an ascetic sense of purity and to make fraud proofs
somewhat smaller?
I argue that the size difference in the fraud proofs is not
interesting, the disruption to the network in an incompatible upgrade
is interesting; and that if it really were desirable reorganization to
move the commitment point could be done as part of a separate change
that changes only the location of things (and/or other trivial
adjustments); and that proceeding int this fashion would minimize
disruption and risk... by making the incompatible changes that will
force network wide software updates be as small and as simple as
possible.
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
(especially ones with poorly understood system wide consequences and low
user autonomy)
This implies there you have no confidence in the unit tests and
functional
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
testing around Bitcoin and should not be a reason to avoid refactoring.
It's more a reason to increase testing so that you will have confidence
when
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
you refactor.
I am speaking from our engineering experience in a public,
world-wide, multi-vendor, multi-version, inter-operable, distributed
system which is constantly changing and in production contains private
code, unknown and assorted hardware, mixtures of versions, unreliable
networks, undisclosed usage patterns, and more sources of complex
behavior than can be counted-- including complex economic incentives
and malicious participants.
Even if we knew the complete spectrum of possible states for the
system the combinatioric explosion makes complete testing infeasible.
Though testing is essential one cannot "unit test" away all the risks
related to deploying a new behavior in the network.
Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 06:59:43 UTC
Permalink
Greg, if you have actual data showing that putting the commitment in the
last transaction would be disruptive, and how disruptive, that would be
appreciated. Of the mining hardware I have looked at, none of it cared at
all what transactions other than the coinbase are. You need to provide a
path to the coinbase for extranonce rolling, but the witness commitment
wouldn't need to be updated.

I'm sorry but it's not clear how this would be an incompatible upgrade,
disruptive to anything other than the transaction selection code. Maybe I'm
missing something? I'm not familiar with all the hardware or pooling setups
out there.

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
I don't think I would classify placing things in consensus critical code
when it doesn't need to be as "structural tidying". Gavin said "pile on"
which you took as implying "a lot", he can correct me, but I believe he
meant "add to".
Nothing being discussed would move something from consensus critical
code to not consensus critical.
What was being discussed was the location of the witness commitment;
which is consensus critical regardless of where it is placed. Should
it be placed in an available location which is compatible with the
existing network, or should the block hashing data structure
immediately be changed in an incompatible way to accommodate it in
order to satisfy an ascetic sense of purity and to make fraud proofs
somewhat smaller?
I argue that the size difference in the fraud proofs is not
interesting, the disruption to the network in an incompatible upgrade
is interesting; and that if it really were desirable reorganization to
move the commitment point could be done as part of a separate change
that changes only the location of things (and/or other trivial
adjustments); and that proceeding int this fashion would minimize
disruption and risk... by making the incompatible changes that will
force network wide software updates be as small and as simple as
possible.
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
(especially ones with poorly understood system wide consequences and low
user autonomy)
This implies there you have no confidence in the unit tests and
functional
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
testing around Bitcoin and should not be a reason to avoid refactoring.
It's more a reason to increase testing so that you will have confidence
when
Post by Ryan Butler via bitcoin-dev
you refactor.
I am speaking from our engineering experience in a public,
world-wide, multi-vendor, multi-version, inter-operable, distributed
system which is constantly changing and in production contains private
code, unknown and assorted hardware, mixtures of versions, unreliable
networks, undisclosed usage patterns, and more sources of complex
behavior than can be counted-- including complex economic incentives
and malicious participants.
Even if we knew the complete spectrum of possible states for the
system the combinatioric explosion makes complete testing infeasible.
Though testing is essential one cannot "unit test" away all the risks
related to deploying a new behavior in the network.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 07:17:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
Greg, if you have actual data showing that putting the commitment in the
last transaction would be disruptive, and how disruptive, that would be
appreciated. Of the mining hardware I have looked at, none of it cared at
all what transactions other than the coinbase are. You need to provide a
path to the coinbase for extranonce rolling, but the witness commitment
wouldn't need to be updated.
I'm sorry but it's not clear how this would be an incompatible upgrade,
disruptive to anything other than the transaction selection code. Maybe I'm
missing something? I'm not familiar with all the hardware or pooling setups
out there.
I didn't comment on the transaction output. I have commented on
coinbase outputs and on a hard-fork.

Using an output in the last transaction would break the assumption
that you can truncate a block and still have a valid block. This is
used by some mining setups currently, because GBT does not generate
the coinbase transaction and so cannot know its size; and you may have
to drop the last transaction(s) to make room for it.

That a block can be truncated and still result in a valid block also
seems like a useful property to me.

If the input for that transaction is supposed to be generated from a
coinbase output some blocks earlier, then this may again run into
hardware output constraints in coinbase transactions. (But it may be
better since it wouldn't matter which output created it.). This could
likely be escaped by creating a zero value output only once and just
rolling it forward.
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 07:54:49 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 7:29 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
What was being discussed was the location of the witness commitment;
which is consensus critical regardless of where it is placed. Should
it be placed in an available location which is compatible with the
existing network, or should the block hashing data structure
immediately be changed in an incompatible way to accommodate it in
order to satisfy an ascetic sense of purity and to make fraud proofs
somewhat smaller?
From this question one could think that when you said "we can do the
cleanup hardfork later" earlier you didn't really meant it. And that
you will oppose to that hardfork later just like you are opposing to
it now.
As said I disagree that making a softfork first and then move the
commitment is less disruptive (because people will need to adapt their
software twice), but if the intention is to never do the second part
then of course I agree it would be less disruptive.
How long after the softfork would you like to do the hardfork?
1 year after the softfork? 2 years? never?
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 08:03:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
From this question one could think that when you said "we can do the
cleanup hardfork later" earlier you didn't really meant it. And that
you will oppose to that hardfork later just like you are opposing to
it now.
As said I disagree that making a softfork first and then move the
commitment is less disruptive (because people will need to adapt their
software twice), but if the intention is to never do the second part
then of course I agree it would be less disruptive.
How long after the softfork would you like to do the hardfork?
1 year after the softfork? 2 years? never?
I think it would be logical to do as part of a hardfork that moved
commitments generally; e.g. a better position for merged mining (such
a hardfork was suggested in 2010 as something that could be done if
merged mining was used), room for commitments to additional block
back-references for compact SPV proofs, and/or UTXO set commitments.
Part of the reason to not do it now is that the requirements for the
other things that would be there are not yet well defined. For these
other applications, the additional overhead is actually fairly
meaningful; unlike the fraud proofs.
Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 08:46:31 UTC
Permalink
My apologies for the apparent miscommunication earlier. It is of interest
to me that the soft-fork be done which is necessary to put a commitment in
the most efficient spot possible, in part because that commitment could be
used for other data such as the merged mining auxiliary blocks, which are
very sensitive to proof size.

Perhaps we have a different view of how the commitment transaction would be
generated. Just as GBT doesn't create the coinbase, it was my expectation
that it wouldn't generate the commitment transaction either -- but
generation of the commitment would be easy, requiring either the coinbase
txid 100 blocks back, or the commitment txid of the prior transaction (note
this impacts SPV mining). The truncation shouldn't be an issue because the
commitment txn would not be part of the list of transactions selected by
GBT, and in any case the truncation would change the witness data which
changes the commitment.

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
From this question one could think that when you said "we can do the
cleanup hardfork later" earlier you didn't really meant it. And that
you will oppose to that hardfork later just like you are opposing to
it now.
As said I disagree that making a softfork first and then move the
commitment is less disruptive (because people will need to adapt their
software twice), but if the intention is to never do the second part
then of course I agree it would be less disruptive.
How long after the softfork would you like to do the hardfork?
1 year after the softfork? 2 years? never?
I think it would be logical to do as part of a hardfork that moved
commitments generally; e.g. a better position for merged mining (such
a hardfork was suggested in 2010 as something that could be done if
merged mining was used), room for commitments to additional block
back-references for compact SPV proofs, and/or UTXO set commitments.
Part of the reason to not do it now is that the requirements for the
other things that would be there are not yet well defined. For these
other applications, the additional overhead is actually fairly
meaningful; unlike the fraud proofs.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 11:08:14 UTC
Permalink
Fair enough.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
From this question one could think that when you said "we can do the
cleanup hardfork later" earlier you didn't really meant it. And that
you will oppose to that hardfork later just like you are opposing to
it now.
As said I disagree that making a softfork first and then move the
commitment is less disruptive (because people will need to adapt their
software twice), but if the intention is to never do the second part
then of course I agree it would be less disruptive.
How long after the softfork would you like to do the hardfork?
1 year after the softfork? 2 years? never?
I think it would be logical to do as part of a hardfork that moved
commitments generally; e.g. a better position for merged mining (such
a hardfork was suggested in 2010 as something that could be done if
merged mining was used), room for commitments to additional block
back-references for compact SPV proofs, and/or UTXO set commitments.
Part of the reason to not do it now is that the requirements for the
other things that would be there are not yet well defined. For these
other applications, the additional overhead is actually fairly
meaningful; unlike the fraud proofs.
Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 16:40:34 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I think it would be logical to do as part of a hardfork that moved
commitments generally; e.g. a better position for merged mining (such
a hardfork was suggested in 2010 as something that could be done if
merged mining was used), room for commitments to additional block
back-references for compact SPV proofs, and/or UTXO set commitments.
Part of the reason to not do it now is that the requirements for the
other things that would be there are not yet well defined. For these
other applications, the additional overhead is actually fairly
meaningful; unlike the fraud proofs.
So just design ahead for those future uses. Make the merkle tree:


root_in_block_header
/ \
tx_data_root other_root
/ \
segwitness_root reserved_for_future_use_root

... where reserved_for_future_use is zero until some future block version
(or perhaps better, is just chosen arbitrarily by the miner and sent along
with the block data until some future block version).

That would minimize future disruption of any code that produced or consumed
merkle proofs of the transaction data or segwitness data, especially if the
reserved_for_future_use_root is allowed to be any arbitrary 256-bit value
and not a constant that would get hard-coded into segwitness-proof-checking
code.
--
--
Gavin Andresen
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-11 16:18:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
I think it would be logical to do as part of a hardfork that moved
commitments generally; e.g. a better position for merged mining (such
a hardfork was suggested in 2010 as something that could be done if
merged mining was used), room for commitments to additional block
back-references for compact SPV proofs, and/or UTXO set commitments.
Part of the reason to not do it now is that the requirements for the
other things that would be there are not yet well defined. For these
other applications, the additional overhead is actually fairly
meaningful; unlike the fraud proofs.
root_in_block_header
/ \
tx_data_root other_root
/ \
segwitness_root reserved_for_future_use_root
This is basically what I meant by

struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
uint256 hashextendedHeader;
}

but my design doesn't calculate other_root as it appears in your tree (is
not necessary).

Since stop requiring bip34 (height in coinbase) is also a hardfork (and a
trivial one) I suggested to move it at the same time. But thinking more
about it, since BIP34 also elegantly solves BIP30, I would keep the height
in the coinbase (even if we move it to the extented header tree as well for
convenience).
That should be able to include future consensus-enforced commitments (extra
back-refs for compact proofs, txo/utxo commitments, etc) or non-consensus
data (merged mining data, miner-published data).
Greg Maxwell suggested to move those later and I answered fair enough. But
thinking more about it, if the extra commitments field is extensible, we
don't need to move anything now, and therefore we don't need for those
designs (extra back-refs for compact proofs, txo/utxo commitments, etc) to
be ready to deploy a hardfork segregated witness: you just need to make
sure that your format is extensible via softfork in the future.

I'm therefore back to the "let's better deploy segregated witness as a
hardfork" position.
The change required to the softfork segregated witnesses implementation
would be relatively small.

Another option would be to deploy both parts (sw and the movement from the
coinbase to the extra header) at the same time but with different
activation conditions, for example:

- For sw: deploy as soon as possible with bip9.
- For the hardfork codebase to extra header movement: 1 year grace + bip9
for later miner upgrade confirmation.
Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-11 16:43:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
This is basically what I meant by
struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
uint256 hashextendedHeader;
}
but my design doesn't calculate other_root as it appears in your tree (is
not necessary).
It is necessary to maintain compatibility with SPV nodes/wallets.
Any code that just checks merkle paths up into the block header would have
to change if the structure of the merkle tree changed to be three-headed at
the top.

If it remains a binary tree, then it doesn't need to change at all-- the
code that produces the merkle paths will just send a path that is one step
deeper.

Plus, it's just weird to have a merkle tree that isn't a binary tree.....
--
--
Gavin Andresen
digitsu412 via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-12 05:13:48 UTC
Permalink
If this means essentially that a soft fork deployment of SegWit will require SPV wallet servers to change their logic (or risk not being able to send payments) then it does seem to me that a hard fork to deploy this non controversial change is not only cleaner (on the data structure side) but safer in terms of the potential to affect the user experience. 






—
Regards,

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 1:43 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
This is basically what I meant by
struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
uint256 hashextendedHeader;
}
but my design doesn't calculate other_root as it appears in your tree (is
not necessary).
It is necessary to maintain compatibility with SPV nodes/wallets.
Any code that just checks merkle paths up into the block header would have
to change if the structure of the merkle tree changed to be three-headed at
the top.
If it remains a binary tree, then it doesn't need to change at all-- the
code that produces the merkle paths will just send a path that is one step
deeper.
Plus, it's just weird to have a merkle tree that isn't a binary tree.....
--
--
Gavin Andresen
Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-12 15:18:46 UTC
Permalink
A segwit supporting server would be required to support relaying segwit
transactions, although a non-segwit server could at least inform a wallet
of segwit txns observed, even if it doesn't relay all information necessary
to validate.

Non segwit servers and wallets would continue operations as if nothing had
occurred.
If this means essentially that a soft fork deployment of SegWit will
require SPV wallet servers to change their logic (or risk not being able to
send payments) then it does seem to me that a hard fork to deploy this non
controversial change is not only cleaner (on the data structure side) but
safer in terms of the potential to affect the user experience.


— Regards,


On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 1:43 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
This is basically what I meant by
struct hashRootStruct
{
uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
uint256 hashextendedHeader;
}
but my design doesn't calculate other_root as it appears in your tree (is
not necessary).
It is necessary to maintain compatibility with SPV nodes/wallets.
Any code that just checks merkle paths up into the block header would have
to change if the structure of the merkle tree changed to be three-headed at
the top.
If it remains a binary tree, then it doesn't need to change at all-- the
code that produces the merkle paths will just send a path that is one step
deeper.
Plus, it's just weird to have a merkle tree that isn't a binary tree.....
--
--
Gavin Andresen
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-14 11:21:43 UTC
Permalink
This means that a server supporting SW might only hear of the tx data and not get the signature data for some transactions, depending on how the relay rules worked (e.g. if the SW peers had higher minrelaytxfee settings than the legacy peers). This would complicate fast block relay code like IBLTs, since we now have to check to see that the recipient has both the tx data and the witness/sig data.

The same issue might happen with block relay if we do SW as a soft fork. A SW node might see a block inv from a legacy node first, and might start downloading the block from that node. This block would then be marked as in-flight, and the witness data might not get downloaded. This shouldn't be too hard to fix by creating an inv for the witness data as a separate object, so that a node could download the block from e.g. Peer 1 and the segwit data from Peer 2.

Of course, the code would be simpler if we did this as a hard fork and we could rely on everyone on the segwit fork supporting the segwit data. Although maybe we want to write the interfaces in a way that supports some nodes not downloading the segwit data anyway, just because not every node will want that data.

I haven't had time to read sipa's code yet. I apologize for talking out of a position of ignorance. For anyone who has, do you feel like sharing how it deals with these network relay issues?

By the way, since this thread is really about SegWit and not about any other mechanism for increasing Bitcoin capacity, perhaps we should rename it accordingly?
A segwit supporting server would be required to support relaying segwit transactions, although a non-segwit server could at least inform a wallet of segwit txns observed, even if it doesn't relay all information necessary to validate.
Non segwit servers and wallets would continue operations as if nothing had occurred.
If this means essentially that a soft fork deployment of SegWit will require SPV wallet servers to change their logic (or risk not being able to send payments) then it does seem to me that a hard fork to deploy this non controversial change is not only cleaner (on the data structure side) but safer in terms of the potential to affect the user experience.
— Regards,
Adam Back via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-14 12:44:57 UTC
Permalink
I think someone, maybe Pieter, commented on this relay issue that it
would be likely very transitory, as a lot of stuff would be fairly
quickly upgraded in practice from previous deployment experience, and
I think anyway there is a huge excess connectivity and capacity in the
p2p network vs having a connected network of various versions, and
supporting SPV client load (SPV load is quite low relative to
capacity, even one respectable node can support a large number of SPV
clients).

(Ie so two classes of network node and connectivity wouldnt be a
problem in practice even if it did persist; also the higher capacity
better run nodes are more likely to upgrade due to having more clued
in power user, miner, pool or company operators).

Maybe someone more detailed knowledge could clarify further.

Adam

On 14 December 2015 at 19:21, Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
This means that a server supporting SW might only hear of the tx data and
not get the signature data for some transactions, depending on how the relay
rules worked (e.g. if the SW peers had higher minrelaytxfee settings than
the legacy peers). This would complicate fast block relay code like IBLTs,
since we now have to check to see that the recipient has both the tx data
and the witness/sig data.
The same issue might happen with block relay if we do SW as a soft fork. A
SW node might see a block inv from a legacy node first, and might start
downloading the block from that node. This block would then be marked as
in-flight, and the witness data might not get downloaded. This shouldn't be
too hard to fix by creating an inv for the witness data as a separate
object, so that a node could download the block from e.g. Peer 1 and the
segwit data from Peer 2.
Of course, the code would be simpler if we did this as a hard fork and we
could rely on everyone on the segwit fork supporting the segwit data.
Although maybe we want to write the interfaces in a way that supports some
nodes not downloading the segwit data anyway, just because not every node
will want that data.
I haven't had time to read sipa's code yet. I apologize for talking out of a
position of ignorance. For anyone who has, do you feel like sharing how it
deals with these network relay issues?
By the way, since this thread is really about SegWit and not about any other
mechanism for increasing Bitcoin capacity, perhaps we should rename it
accordingly?
On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:18 PM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
A segwit supporting server would be required to support relaying segwit
transactions, although a non-segwit server could at least inform a wallet of
segwit txns observed, even if it doesn't relay all information necessary to
validate.
Non segwit servers and wallets would continue operations as if nothing had occurred.
If this means essentially that a soft fork deployment of SegWit will require
SPV wallet servers to change their logic (or risk not being able to send
payments) then it does seem to me that a hard fork to deploy this non
controversial change is not only cleaner (on the data structure side) but
safer in terms of the potential to affect the user experience.
— Regards,
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Chris via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 14:51:36 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
Why segwitness as a soft fork? Stuffing the segwitness merkle tree in
the coinbase is messy and will just complicate consensus-critical code
(as opposed to making the right side of the merkle tree in
block.version=5 blocks the segwitness data).
Agreed. I thought the rule was no contentious hark forks. It seems
hardly anyone opposes this change and there seems to be widespread
agreement that the hardfork version would be much cleaner.
Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 04:33:16 UTC
Permalink
Post by Wladimir J. van der Laan via bitcoin-dev
TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk. BIP9
and segwit will also make further improvements easier and faster to
deploy. We’ll continue to set the stage for non-bandwidth-increase-based
scaling, while building additional tools that would make bandwidth
increases safer long term. Further work will prepare Bitcoin for further
increases, which will become possible when justified, while also providing
the groundwork to make them justifiable.
Sounds good to me.
Better late than never, let me comment on why I believe pursuing this plan
is important.

For months, the block size debate, and the apparent need for agreement on a
hardfork has distracted from needed engineering work, fed the external
impression that nothing is being done, and generally created a toxic
environment to work in. It has affected my own productivity and health, and
I do not think I am alone.

I believe that soft-fork segwit can help us out of this deadlock and get us
going again. It does not require the pervasive assumption that the entire
world will simultaneously switch to new consensus rules like a hardfork
does, while at the same time:
* Give a short-term capacity bump
* Show the world that scalability is being worked on
* Actually improve scalability (as opposed to just scale) by reducing
bandwidth/storage and indirectly improving the effectiveness of systems
like Lightning.
* Solve several unrelated problems at the same time (fraud proofs, script
extensibility, malleability, ...).

So I'd like to ask the community that we work towards this plan, as it
allows to make progress without being forced to make a possibly divisive
choice for one hardfork or another yet.
--
Pieter
Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 04:42:03 UTC
Permalink
Post by Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
Solve several unrelated problems at the same time (fraud proofs, script
extensibility, malleability, ...).
By "solve" do you mean, "actually implement", or do you mean "make
future implementation theoretically possible?"

In other words, would a deployment of SW involve the creation of new
network message for relaying fraud proofs, a specification that SPV
wallet developers can use to validate these messages and so know when to
ignore the highest (but invalid) PoW chain, and the ability to
automatically generate and broadcast these proofs in Bitcoin Core?
Alex Morcos via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 04:44:49 UTC
Permalink
I'm also strongly in favor of moving forward with this plan.

A couple of points:
1) There has been too much confusion in looking at segwit as an alternative
way to increase the block size and I think that is incorrect. It should
not be drawn into the block size debate as it brings many needed
improvements and tools we'd want even if no one were worried about block
size now.
2) The full capacity increase plan Greg lays out makes it clear that we can
accomplish a tremendous amount without a contentious hard fork at this
point.
3) Let's stop arguing endlessly and actually do work that will benefit
everyone.




On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 11:33 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Dec 07, 2015 at 10:02:17PM +0000, Gregory Maxwell via
TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk. BIP9
and segwit will also make further improvements easier and faster to
deploy. We’ll continue to set the stage for non-bandwidth-increase-based
scaling, while building additional tools that would make bandwidth
increases safer long term. Further work will prepare Bitcoin for further
increases, which will become possible when justified, while also
providing
the groundwork to make them justifiable.
Sounds good to me.
Better late than never, let me comment on why I believe pursuing this plan
is important.
For months, the block size debate, and the apparent need for agreement on
a hardfork has distracted from needed engineering work, fed the external
impression that nothing is being done, and generally created a toxic
environment to work in. It has affected my own productivity and health, and
I do not think I am alone.
I believe that soft-fork segwit can help us out of this deadlock and get
us going again. It does not require the pervasive assumption that the
entire world will simultaneously switch to new consensus rules like a
* Give a short-term capacity bump
* Show the world that scalability is being worked on
* Actually improve scalability (as opposed to just scale) by reducing
bandwidth/storage and indirectly improving the effectiveness of systems
like Lightning.
* Solve several unrelated problems at the same time (fraud proofs, script
extensibility, malleability, ...).
So I'd like to ask the community that we work towards this plan, as it
allows to make progress without being forced to make a possibly divisive
choice for one hardfork or another yet.
--
Pieter
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 04:50:03 UTC
Permalink
I am fully in support of the plan laid out in "Capacity increases for the
bitcoin system".

This plan provides real benefit to the ecosystem in solving a number of
longstanding problems in bitcoin. It improves the scalability of bitcoin
considerably.

Furthermore it is time that we stop bikeshedding, start implementing, and
move forward, lest we lose more developers to the toxic atmosphere this
hard-fork debacle has created.

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Dec 07, 2015 at 10:02:17PM +0000, Gregory Maxwell via
TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk. BIP9
and segwit will also make further improvements easier and faster to
deploy. We’ll continue to set the stage for non-bandwidth-increase-based
scaling, while building additional tools that would make bandwidth
increases safer long term. Further work will prepare Bitcoin for further
increases, which will become possible when justified, while also
providing
the groundwork to make them justifiable.
Sounds good to me.
Better late than never, let me comment on why I believe pursuing this plan
is important.
For months, the block size debate, and the apparent need for agreement on
a hardfork has distracted from needed engineering work, fed the external
impression that nothing is being done, and generally created a toxic
environment to work in. It has affected my own productivity and health, and
I do not think I am alone.
I believe that soft-fork segwit can help us out of this deadlock and get
us going again. It does not require the pervasive assumption that the
entire world will simultaneously switch to new consensus rules like a
* Give a short-term capacity bump
* Show the world that scalability is being worked on
* Actually improve scalability (as opposed to just scale) by reducing
bandwidth/storage and indirectly improving the effectiveness of systems
like Lightning.
* Solve several unrelated problems at the same time (fraud proofs, script
extensibility, malleability, ...).
So I'd like to ask the community that we work towards this plan, as it
allows to make progress without being forced to make a possibly divisive
choice for one hardfork or another yet.
--
Pieter
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Douglas Roark via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 05:29:16 UTC
Permalink
Post by Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
I am fully in support of the plan laid out in "Capacity increases
for the bitcoin system".
This plan provides real benefit to the ecosystem in solving a
number of longstanding problems in bitcoin. It improves the
scalability of bitcoin considerably.
Furthermore it is time that we stop bikeshedding, start
implementing, and move forward, lest we lose more developers to
the toxic atmosphere this hard-fork debacle has created.
Another +1 here. While I'd still like to see some sort of short-term
bump happen this year - good points have been raised about SegWit
uptake by wallet devs, for one thing - I really do think this is one
of the last pieces of the puzzle that'll make Bitcoin reasonably
stable and robust. If people have legitimate concerns, that's great,
and they should be addressed. I just worry that more navel-gazing and
bikeshedding will play into the hands of those with less than noble
intentions. That and, due to the somewhat complicated nature of
SegWit, it may take time to get skeptical miners and wallet devs on-boar
d.

While we're talking about capacity increases, I'd like to reiterate
that I do think there should be some sort of short-term bump (Jeff's
BIP 102 or his "BIP 202" variant, Dr. Back's 2/4/8 proposal ("BIP
248"), etc.), hopefully chosen by this summer so that everybody can
start to prepare. I believe the KISS theory will work best. I talked
to a couple of miners at Scaling Bitcoin. It was obvious they
generally prefer simple solutions. (For that matter, if I put my
miner's cap on, I prefer simple solutions too!) The research presented
at Scaling Bitcoin regarding block size formulas was quite interesting
and worthy of discussion. The research was also, IMO, nowhere near
ready for consensus. Work and discussions on that front should
certainly continue and push for a more permanent (final?) block size
solution. I just think that, barring some extraordinary solution that
hasn't been widely discussed yet, a permanent solution isn't feasible
right now. A temporary bump isn't ideal. It's just the only thing I've
seen that strikes me as having any real shot at consensus.

- --
- ---
Douglas Roark
Cryptocurrency, network security, travel, and art.
https://onename.com/droark
***@vt.edu
PGP key ID: 26623924
Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 05:21:55 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 4:33 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Dec 07, 2015 at 10:02:17PM +0000, Gregory Maxwell via
TL;DR: I propose we work immediately towards the segwit 4MB block
soft-fork which increases capacity and scalability, and recent speedups
and incoming relay improvements make segwit a reasonable risk. BIP9
and segwit will also make further improvements easier and faster to
deploy. We’ll continue to set the stage for non-bandwidth-increase-based
scaling, while building additional tools that would make bandwidth
increases safer long term. Further work will prepare Bitcoin for further
increases, which will become possible when justified, while also
providing
the groundwork to make them justifiable.
Sounds good to me.
Better late than never, let me comment on why I believe pursuing this plan
is important.
For months, the block size debate, and the apparent need for agreement on
a hardfork has distracted from needed engineering work, fed the external
impression that nothing is being done, and generally created a toxic
environment to work in. It has affected my own productivity and health, and
I do not think I am alone.
I believe that soft-fork segwit can help us out of this deadlock and get
us going again. It does not require the pervasive assumption that the
entire world will simultaneously switch to new consensus rules like a
* Give a short-term capacity bump
* Show the world that scalability is being worked on
* Actually improve scalability (as opposed to just scale) by reducing
bandwidth/storage and indirectly improving the effectiveness of systems
like Lightning.
* Solve several unrelated problems at the same time (fraud proofs, script
extensibility, malleability, ...).
So I'd like to ask the community that we work towards this plan, as it
allows to make progress without being forced to make a possibly divisive
choice for one hardfork or another yet.
Thank you for saying this. I also think the plan is solid and delivers
multiple benefits without being contentious. The number of wins are so
numerous, it's frankly a no-brainer.

I guess the next step for segwit is a BIP and deployment on a testnet?
Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 08:07:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 4:33 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <
Post by Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
So I'd like to ask the community that we work towards this plan, as it
allows to make progress without being forced to make a possibly divisive
choice for one hardfork or another yet.
Thank you for saying this. I also think the plan is solid and delivers
multiple benefits without being contentious. The number of wins are so
numerous, it's frankly a no-brainer.
+1's are off-topic, but... +1. My impression is that each of libsecp256k1,
versionbits, segregated witness, IBLT, weak blocks, and OP_CSV have
been demonstrated to be significant improvements that are implementable,
and don't introduce any new attacks or risks [0]. There's some freaking
awesome engineering that's gone into all of those.
Post by Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev
I guess the next step for segwit is a BIP and deployment on a testnet?
I think the following proposed features are as yet missing from Pieter's
segwit branch, and I'm guessing patches for them would be appreciated:

- enforcing the proposed base+witness/4 < 1MB calculation
- applying limits to sigops seen in witness signatures

I guess there might be other things that still need to be implemented
as well (and presumably bugs of course)?

I think I'm convinced that the proposed plan is the best approach (as
opposed to separate base<1MB, witness<3MB limits, or done as a hard fork,
or without committing to a merkle head for the witnesses, eg), though.

jl2012 already pointed to a draft segwit BIP in another thread, repeated
here though:

https://github.com/jl2012/bips/blob/segwit/bip-segwit.mediawiki

Cheers,
aj (hoping that was enough content after the +1 to not get modded ;)

[0] I'm still not persuaded that even a small increase in blocksize
doesn't introduce unacceptable risks (frankly, I'm not entirely
persuaded the *current* limits don't have unacceptable risk) and that
frustrates me no end. But I guess (even after six months of reading
arguments about it!) I'm equally unpersuaded that there's actually
more to the intense desire for more blocksize is anything other than
fear/uncertainty/doubt mixed with a desire for transactions to be
effectively free, rather than costing even a few cents each... So,
personally, since the above doesn't really resolve that quandry
for me, it doesn't really resolve the blocksize debate for me
either. YMMV.
Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-21 09:56:54 UTC
Permalink
To clarify, although I have defended the deployment of segwit as a
hardfork, I have no strong opinion on whether to do that or do it as a
softfork first and then do a hardfork to move things out of the
coinbase to a better place.
I have a strong opinion against never doing the later hardfork though.
I would have supported segwit for Bitcoin even if it was only possible
as a hardfork, but there's a softfork version and that will hopefully
accelerate its deployment.
Since the plan seems to be to do a softfork first and a hardfork
moving the witness tree (and probably more things) outside of the
coinbase later, I support the plan for segwit deployment.
In fact, the plan is very exciting to me.
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-08 23:48:58 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
The particular proposal amounts to a 4MB blocksize increase at worst.
I understood that SegWit would allow about 1.75 MB of data in the average case while also allowing up to 4 MB of data in the worst case. This means that the mining and block distribution network would need a larger safety factor to deal with worst-case situations, right? If you want to make sure that nothing goes wrong when everything is at its worst, you need to size your network pipes to handle 4 MB in a timely (DoS-resistant) fashion, but you'd normally only be able to use 1.75 MB of it. It seems to me that it would be safer to use a 3 MB limit, and that way you'd also be able to use 3 MB of actual transactions.

As an accounting trick to bypass the 1 MB limit, SegWit sounds like it might make things less well accounted for.
Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 00:23:27 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
I understood that SegWit would allow about 1.75 MB of data in the average
case while also allowing up to 4 MB of data in the worst case. This means
that the mining and block distribution network would need a larger safety
factor to deal with worst-case situations, right? If you want to make sure
By contrast it does not reduce the safety factor for the UTXO set at
all; which most hold as a much greater concern in general; and that
isn't something you can say for a block size increase.

With respect to witness safety factor; it's only needed in the case of
strategic or malicious behavior by miners-- both concerns which
several people promoting large block size increases have not only
disregarded but portrayed as unrealistic fear-mongering. Are you
concerned about it? In any case-- the other improvements described in
my post give me reason to believe that risks created by that
possibility will be addressable.
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 00:40:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
By contrast it does not reduce the safety factor for the UTXO set at
all; which most hold as a much greater concern in general;
I don't agree that "most" hold UTXO as a much greater concern in general. I think that it's a concern that has been addressed less, which means it is a more unsolved concern. But it is not currently a bottleneck on block size. Miners can afford way more RAM than 1 GB, and non-mining full nodes don't need to store the UTXO in memory.I think that at the moment, block propagation time is the bottleneck, not UTXO size. It confuses me that SigWit is being pushed as a short-term fix to the capacity issue when it does not address the short-term bottleneck at all.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
and that
isn't something you can say for a block size increase.
True.

I'd really like to see a grand unified cost metric that includes UTXO expansion. In the mean time, I think miners can use a bit more RAM.
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
With respect to witness safety factor; it's only needed in the case of
strategic or malicious behavior by miners-- both concerns which
several people promoting large block size increases have not only
disregarded but portrayed as unrealistic fear-mongering. Are you
concerned about it?
Some. Much less than e.g. Peter Todd, for example, but when other people see something as a concern that I don't, I try to pay attention to it. I expect Peter wouldn't like the safety factor issue, and I'm surprised he didn't bring it up.

Even if I didn't care about adversarial conditions, it would still interest me to pay attention to the safety factor for political reasons, as it would make subsequent blocksize increases much more difficult. Conspiracy theorists might have a field day with that one...
Post by Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
In any case-- the other improvements described in
my post give me reason to believe that risks created by that
possibility will be addressable.
I'll take a look and try to see which of the worst-case concerns can and cannot be addressed by those improvements.
Daniele Pinna via bitcoin-dev
2015-12-09 12:28:52 UTC
Permalink
If SegWit were implemented as a hardfork, could the entire blockchain be
reorganized starting from the Genesis block to free up historical space?
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