Yes, as a whole, but I am sorry, your "tip" proposal is very very very
bad as it is, think a little bit more about your latest answer and you
will understand why
I am a bit perplexed sometimes about what is proposed on this list
Adding services paid by the miners is not a bad idea, like some
proposals that were posted here proposing some system to validate/format
the blocks for the miners
But, first, the highest priority is to scale the full nodes and this
cannot depend on miners, then once this is done we can imagine other
services on top of it paid by the miners or others (+lightning & co)
I have already explained many times my thoughts on the subject, I don't
pretend that they represent the perfect solution but at least it's
different from what we can read , so I think that the core dev team
should setup a task force/group to solve this quickly now, the
accumulation of strange proposals/workarounds here does not help
Because it's a real question for everybody in the current context
whether we can trust bitcoin or not, unfortunately the answer currently
tends toward the later, or please explain me why this statement could be
wrong
- Full nodes already perform many valuable services, and simply
allowing people to pay for better service is something operators can
do now - even without it being baked into bitcoind. Paying for
access to a higher-speed relay network, for example, is something that
many operators would do.
- Baking in the ability to add service fees could make more people
*want* to run more high quality, highly available full nodes... which
is really one of the most important things developers can be doing.
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should
certainly not depend on miners, should certainly not involve
another wasteful pow and should certainly not encourage any
collusion between participants like miners are doing (ie full
nodes pools for example or miners creating full nodes pools)
Post by Tomas via bitcoin-devThe ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools,
by outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW. By
doing so they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and
proof-of-goodwill for a small fee.
We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template
* Does not contain a valid header yet
* Contains the transaction selection
* Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the
block reward (say 0.5%) to themselves
* Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC
resistant hash function behind a OP_RETURN.
The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be
leading. A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of
their own, adding the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce
themselves. That way they would set up a competition among full
nodes.
This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a
pool's interest to do this via naming and shaming.
Tomas
bitcrust
Post by Ben Thompson via bitcoin-devI feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of
users would likely download the blockchain from a node that was
not enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like
unnecessary cost as in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no
such tips in sharing files and the blockchain distribution is in
eccense the same thing. However perhaps I am underestimating the
generosity of node operators but I feel that adding a cost to
the blockchain (assuming that all users add a tip requirement)
would lead to centralisation.
On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev,
- Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address. Users that need
to download the block chain from that node can be encouraged
to send a tip to the peers that served them (by % served).
Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.
- A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the
blockchain. If they do, users that don't specify a tip
cannot use them.
For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting
their own full node. After all, if you have to pay $15
just to get a copy of the blockchain, that just adds to the
already expensive prospect of hosting a full node.
As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your
money back and more. This is the an incentive for quality,
long term hosting.
In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick
around longer. It also discourages "installation spam"
attacks on the network.
Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is successful.
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